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THE UNDP AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BEIRUT 
SOUTHERN SUBURBS FOLLOWING THE JULY 2006 WAR: 
AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
Layal Abu Darwich 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Throughout its existence as an independent state, Lebanon has had its share of domestic 
strife and foreign interventions including Israeli invasion with devastating consequences. In 
2005, and after the murder of the ex-premier Rafic Hariri, Lebanon entered a new era of 
heightened political instability. A year later, Israel launched a devastating war against Hezbollah 
and Lebanon which led to many civilian casualties and unprecedented damage to the country‘s 
infrastructure. The thesis addresses the participation of the United Nations Program in the 
rehabilitation of Beirut Southern Suburbs in the aftermath of the devastation caused by the July 
2006 war.  While the thesis sheds lights on all significant regional and international efforts to 
deal with the socio-economic consequences of the July war, its principal focus is on the UNDP 
interventions that were carried out to rehabilitate, recover and restore the lives and livelihoods in 
the Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS). The thesis thus examines the accomplished and ongoing 
UNDP programs in the BSS in order to highlight the important albeit controversial role of 
international organizations (specifically the UNDP) in the long-term alteration of social and 
behavioral interactions with the aim of fostering peace-building and community-building. The 
 
 
thesis argues that such international-donor programs do not only aim to physically rebuild and 
rehabilitate infrastructure but have the loftier goal of laying the foundations for sustainable 
development and peace-building, as envisioned by the UNDP, other international organizations 
and Western governments. 
 
Keywords: Hezbollah, Human development, Israel, Lebanon, Peace-building, Reconstruction, 
Recovery, war. 
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CAHPETR ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This study addresses the participation of United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
in the rehabilitation of Lebanon‘s southern suburb in the aftermath of the devastation caused by 
the July 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah. It will mainly focus on the UNDP interventions 
to rehabilitate, recover and restore the lives and livelihoods in the area. The study will examine 
both the completed and the ongoing programs implemented in the Beirut Southern Suburbs in 
order to shed light on the important role that international organizations like the UNDP can play 
in the long-term modification of social and behavioral interactions aimed towards peace-building 
and community bonding. 
The UNDP does not officially recognize Hezbollah which is perceived to be in control of Beirut 
Southern Suburbs (BSS), the south of Lebanon and some areas of the Bekaa Valley (news outlets 
often refer to the Beirut Southern Suburbs as a "state within a state"). The UNDP, however, had 
to liaise and cooperate with informal Hezbollah members in order to implement its programs in 
areas under the party's control.  
Local governance, as practiced in Lebanon, means that municipalities often represent the voters' 
political inclinations and reflect the powers that are effectively in control of a designated region. 
As such, the UNDP deals with elected municipal officials, who are sympathetic with the political 
orientations and views of Hezbollah, if not directly affiliated with it.   
 
 
 
The UNDP has a long history of involvement in post-war recovery where it seeks to 
promote peace and development. The UNDP‘s post-conflict recovery has a main purpose to 
establish ―sustainable economic growth and human development‖, all the while looking to find 
and remedy the factors that may cause conflict to arise again.  In addition to the restoration of 
economic and institutional arrangements to the way they were before a war, post-conflict 
recovery also strives to create  a transformation that allows countries that have been devastated 
by war to rebuild the foundations for ―self-sustaining development‖, democracy, and peace-
building. 
Post-war interventions mainly aim to rehabilitate damages and traumas, to provide humanitarian 
relief, and to restore livelihoods. However, the UNDP‘s approach goes beyond recovery to focus 
on the humanitarian dimension of interventions, aiming to rebuild communities and to engage 
them in the participation in the rehabilitation and sustainable development processes. 
The UNDP interventions targeted the urgent priorities and needs of the war-affected 
communities. It significantly impacted the lives of this community by restoring livelihoods, 
income and employment status, as well as supporting income-generating projects. The UNDP 
implemented socio-economic activities aimed at reducing poverty, expanding economic 
opportunities, and providing employment. The organization perceives those interventions to 
strengthen peace-building and, hence, reducing the chances of recurring conflicts.  
The long-term goals of such programs also aim at shaking the current status-quos by slowly 
shifting the mentality of the communities in question towards a better civic understanding of 
their surroundings. It bases its strategy on a simple rationale: People become gradually immune 
to partisan and foreign manipulations once they have a future to look ahead for, whether it is 
higher education, a blossoming career or a bill-paying job.  
 
 
The study will argue that such international-donor programs aim not only to physically 
rebuild infrastructures but also to lay strategic plans for human development and therefore invest 
in community-building projects.  
The theoretical framework of the thesis is based on recognizing the growing role of non-
state actors in the development process in third world countries, especially those like Lebanon 
that have undertaken violent and destructive conflicts. As such, it is worth providing a brief 
literature review of the role of no-state actors in international relations is worth being 
highlighted. The international system consists of nation-states, international organizations, and 
private actors.
1
 ―The increasing number of international organizations is parallel to the increasing 
levels of economic, political, social and cultural transactions between individuals, societies and 
states.‖2 In this context, Lynn Miller in ―Global Order: Values and Power in International 
Politics‖ stated that ―the growth of so many kinds of non-state actors challenges and even 
weakens the state-centric concept of international politics and replaces it with a transnational 
system in which relationships are more complex. These organizations changed the international 
environment.‖3  
The proliferation of non-state actors has recently led some scholars of international relations ―to 
conclude that states are declining in importance and that non-state actors are gaining status and 
influence.‖ New theories of international relations such as the "complex interdependence of 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were formed in order to explain new developments." Scholars 
such as Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkoph stated that "as the world grown smaller, the mutual 
                                                          
1 Muhittin Ataman, “The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-States,” The Turkish 
Journal of International Relations 2 (2003), retrieved February 13, 2011, 
http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/ataman2.htm. 
2
 Ibid 
3
 Ibid 
 
 
dependence of nation-states and other transnational political actors on one another has grown."
4
  
According to Miller, non-state actors are divided into two categories: ―International 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)‖ and ―Transnational or International Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs)‖. ―The first group consists of the non-state actors that are 
created by nation-states. They are officially documented by government agencies. The second 
group of non-state international actors is established not by nation-states, but by certain group of 
individuals, businessmen and other societal forces. This group has no legal bonds with nation-
states; therefore, they are truly transnational.‖5 ―IGOs are voluntary associations of sovereign 
states established to pursue many objectives for which states want to cooperate through sort of 
formal structure and to which states are unable to realize by themselves.‖  
Today a large number IGOs existed and were the result of treaties and negotiations ―which 
mainly reflect preferences of stronger states.‖6 In this context, Miller stated that IGOs ―are part 
of the Westphalian state system in which IGOs are instruments of nation-states.‖7 The efficiency 
of IGOs varies from one area to another, one state to another, and also the degree of influence is 
much related to the weakness of state, as well the capability of states to undertake and implement 
their own provisions. etc., whereas the ―powerful states are less constrained by the principle of 
IGOs than those who are relatively weak.‖8 
Today, ―non-state actors began to substitute nation-states in many areas.‖9  As viewed by 
realists, IGOs are simply states‘ instruments. In this context, Kenneth Waltz says that IGOs are 
unable to alter the perception of states and the role of international organizations remains 
                                                          
4
 Ibid 
5
 Ibid 
6
 Ibid 
7
 Ibid 
8
 Ibid 
9
 Ibid 
 
 
minimal.
10
  Nevertheless, this perception was questioned by other scholars who strongly argue 
that some nation-states are unable to resolve to national and global problems, on their own.  
―Neoliberals accept the state-dominated view of realists; nevertheless, they suggest that 
international institutions are also part of the world system and effective in international 
politics.‖11 In this respect, "the gap between the nation-state ideal and political reality seems to 
be actually growing rather than narrowing, since recent technological, economic, and social 
developments have posed enormous challenges to the capacity of territorial states to fulfill their 
traditional functions of security, welfare, and identity.‖12 ―When state boundaries do not overlap 
with national boundaries which do not in most cases, the ascendance of nationalism as a 
generative order will set into motion a disruptive dual-track process that predisposes stateless-
nations … to embark in energetic efforts to normalize their existence.‖13 
It is impossible to separate public from private, domestic from foreign, and political from 
economic and social matters; therefore, previously narrow concepts of the political process 
became problematic. "if the political process is defined in terms of the authoritative allocation of 
values, then private actions in economic and social realms, which affect the values available to 
other actors, are political actions. If these actions have an impact across state boundaries, they 
are transnational."
14
 A broader definition of the political process draws attention ―to the 
inadequacy of the state centric understanding of the world politics.‖15 For this purpose, ―the 
state-centric model‖ seems to consider ―activities of transnational actors as outside of the 
                                                          
10
 Ibid 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Ibid 
13
 Ibid 
14
 Ibid 
15
 Ibid 
 
 
political process.‖16 A powerful liaison exists between the distribution of power and the role of 
non-state actors. As viewed by realism, ―rational actors concern about their self-interests in an 
anarchic international system. Power is the key variable in explaining behavior of states.‖17 
Realist scholars tend to grant ―less chance for international cooperation and for effective 
international institutions.‖ On the other hand, other scholars like draws on the core concept of 
realists to validate the ―international cooperation… for the long-term interests‖.18 
The thesis will elaborate more on the UNDP post-July 2006 war reconstruction strategy 
in Beirut Southern Suburbs area.  It will show how the July 2006 war on the Beirut Southern 
Suburbs area impacted the socio-economic situation, and will examine the projects implemented 
by the UNDP in the area.  
Chapter one will provide an overview of the post war reconstruction theories and 
practices in the era following the World War II, and will highlight the models of post-conflict 
recovery applied throughout history, including the one used by the UNDP.  
Chapter two will focus on the outbreak of the summer 2006 war on Lebanon as well as 
will detail its effects on the entire country, and specifically on the Beirut Southern Suburbs. The 
chapter will also provide an overview on the area following the July war, and the major donors 
and players who took part of the reconstruction process. 
Lebanon is no stranger to violent conflicts. For half a century, this tiny eastern Mediterranean 
country has suffered domestic strife and multiple invasions. In 1958, a short civil war broke out 
which was then followed by a far more devastating one that lasted from 1975 to 1991.  Israel, 
                                                          
16
 Ibid 
17
 Ibid 
18
 Ibid 
 
 
Lebanon's southern neighbor, invaded the country in 1978 and 1982 and occupied parts of 
southern Lebanon where it established a ―buffer security zone‖ until its withdrawal in 2000.  
The violence in Lebanon trailed well into the 21st century. In 2005, ex-premier Rafic Hariri was 
killed. His was the first in a series of assassinations that targeted many well-known, pro-Western 
political and media figures. One year later, in July 2006, Israel launched a fierce war against 
Hezbollah (self-dubbed as the ―Islamic Resistance‖) a predominantly Shiite group founded in 
1985 to fight off the Israeli occupation at that time. The war lasted for 33 days and resulted in 
1200 Lebanese civilian deaths as well as massive destruction in Lebanese populated areas and 
infrastructures
19
. 
Unfortunately, the rapid unfolding of those events impeded any immediate and much needed 
full-scale action for recovery, rehabilitation and development in one of the most neglected areas 
by international donors: the Beirut Southern Suburbs.   
The summer 2006 war further aggravated poverty and worsened the socio-economic conditions 
due to the massive destruction of lives and livelihoods in different areas of Lebanon. It resulted 
in massive obliteration of key social, economic, and transport infrastructures which disrupted the 
country‘s capacity to deliver social and economic services. The human toll was great: Around 
1,200 Lebanese casualties and over 4,000 injured; hundreds of whom were left with permanent 
disabilities. The population also suffered the internal displacement of almost a million people.
20
   
The war also led to the loss of employment throughout Beirut Southern Suburbs due to the 
destruction of around 2500 small and medium businesses adding to the burdens of governmental 
social services.  The hostilities totally demolished 250 buildings in the Beirut Southern Suburbs 
area and around 40,000 people were displaced from that area alone.  The 2006 war further 
                                                          
19Roger MacGanty, “Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon: A Challenge to the Liberal Peace?” Conflict, Security & 
Development 7(3) (2007): 460-461. 
20 Ibid 
 
 
eroded the living conditions of the population mostly in terms of unemployment and students 
dropout rates. While unemployment was common before the war like other places in the country, 
the destruction of businesses and light industries in the Southern Suburbs compounded the 
situation into catastrophic dimensions.  
Unemployment aggravated poverty, and a significant number of youths were forced to leave 
schools and education to seek jobs in order to help their families and selves to survive.  The 
difficult living conditions also lead to the outbreak of social problems like drug addiction, 
increased spontaneous clashes, tensions, and violence among youths, as well as vandalism and 
robberies. 
In this atmosphere of vulnerability, low-level of education, unemployment and poverty, the 
youth in particular, or the ―war generation‖ in Beirut Southern Suburbs has become a ―detached 
generation‖ with a sense of alienation and marginalization. This represents a particular challenge 
to their participation and integration in economic and social life, a requirement that is essential to 
building and sustaining peace. A vulnerable youth population - combined with unemployment, 
poverty and other factors – can lead to violence. 
In order to identify needs and interventions, the UNDP conducted a post-war living conditions 
assessment in close partnership with the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS) and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). Beirut Southern Suburbs are largely unfunded by the 
international community- mostly due to political considerations. The suburbs are considered to 
be Hezbollah's stronghold and the party is shunned by Western powers.  As a result, the locals 
are perceived to harbor feelings of alienation and discrimination towards the national 
government as well as the international community. 
 
 
The UNDP was able to initiate its emergency program in BSS immediately after the war and 
later extended it to the ―Recovery of Lives and Livelihoods Program‖ despite the challenges 
mentioned above.  
Chapter three will provide a brief on the background of the history of the UNDP‘s role in 
Lebanon and a glance back on the UNDP role and mandate in Lebanon since the 1990s and prior 
to the eruption of the July 2006 attack on Lebanon. It will emphasize on how UNDP partnership 
modality in Lebanon evolved during those years, and will highlight the major challenges and 
social actions undertaken after the cease fire in August 2006. The chapter will also trace the 
UNDP‘s response to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, and examine the actual planning for Early 
Recovery in the midst of war. 
Chapter four will elaborate more on the UNDP interventions in BSS, and highlight the 
challenges and the major initiatives undertaken to recover and restore lives and Livelihoods. 
The UNDP has managed to build a strong and trusting relationship with all concerned entities in 
BSS closely liaising with the local communities at both the grassroots and the local authorities‘, 
namely municipalities, level. It was considered an important achievement towards gaining 
insight into the residents' characteristics pertaining to social, economic, cultural and political 
traits, and laying foundations for better planning towards serving the community.  
The UNDP is keen on maintaining its ongoing constructive interventions in BSS, especially 
since it is perceived as a neutral arbiter with the ability to positively affect the livelihoods and 
opportunities of vulnerable groups and to strengthen inter-communal relationships.  
Due to the lack of an equitable development plan in Lebanon, domestic and international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations, have taken on a significant role rebuilding 
Lebanon. In the larger context, and with the exception of UNDP and its donors‘ efforts, Beirut 
 
 
Southern Suburbs have been marginalized. The area still lacks targeted donor funding, even after 
the July 2006 war and the May 2008 clashes which have exacerbated the economic conditions, 
encouraging local youths to engage in violent and law-breaking actions within Beirut Southern 
Suburbs and its surroundings.   
The population currently suffers from deficient socio-economic conditions and threats to its 
livelihoods and this current situation is further aggravating previously established vulnerabilities. 
The UNDP has found it necessary in this context to make a transition from its ―Early Recovery 
Program‖ to the ―Recovery of Lives and Livelihoods‖ in the Beirut Southern Suburbs program. 
Based on the above mentioned interventions, efforts have been made since 2006 aiming at 
decreasing poverty, unemployment, and supporting vulnerable groups, and these efforts have 
resulted in successfully undertaking projects for better livelihoods. 
The conclusion will reassess the UNDP‘s intervention in Beirut Southern Suburbs and 
highlight the major lessons learned from this experience.  It will also address and evaluate the 
criticism raised by many following this intervention, criticism that targets the UNDP political 
agenda in the area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
POST CONFLICT RECOVERY IN THE ERA FOLLOWING THE WORLD WAR II: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
The term post conflict intervention is defined as the need to help in the reconstruction of 
―weak‖ or ―failing states after civil wars or states clashes and the concept made its way into the 
literature on international relations development. It means providing and enhancing socio 
economic conditions, strengthening governance, ―rule of law, as well as other elements of justice 
and reconciliation and, very centrally, security‖.21 Recovery is also defined as ―achieving socio-
economic well-being, involving food security, public health, shelter, educational systems, and a 
social safety net for all citizens… [and]… an economic strategy for assistance that [is] designed 
to ensure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, to generate employment, to open markets, 
to create legal and regulatory reforms, to lay down the foundation for international trade and 
investment, and to establish transparent banking and financial institutions‖.22 
 
 
The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery 
Recent history has witnessed a wave of interventions by government and International 
agencies in societies that have undergone a series of conflicts, interventions that took the form of 
humanitarian involvement such as the one in Somalia. They have been justified in terms of 
                                                          
21 John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Post Conflict Reconstruction,” The Washington Quarterly (2002): 
89, retrieved March 10, 2010, http://www.twq.com/02autumn/hamre.pdf. 
22 United Nations Development Program, “Post Conflict Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity” (paper prepared at the 
quarterly meeting at UNDP, Lebanon, October 12 2008). 
 
 
humanitarian international law despite their entrenchments on a narrowly reinterpreted 
understanding of ―Westphalian‖ notions of state sovereignty.23 
In 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia, countries, mainly Europe, agreed to ―bring an end to the 
Thirty Years' War, which had drowned Europe in blood in battles over religion, defined the 
principles of sovereignty and equality in numerous sub-contracts, and in this way became the 
constitution of the new system of states in Europe‖.24 The ―Westphalian‖ system peaked in the 
late 1800‘s; some forcible interventions were carried out by powerful states in the domestic 
affairs of weaker ones between 1850 and 1900, but they were less frequent than the periods prior 
and following these years.
25
 ―The Peace of Westphalia is important in modern international 
relations theory and is often defined as the beginning of the international system‖. 26―The Charter 
of the United Nations today enshrines the norms of sovereignty, where article 2(4) prohibits 
attacks on ―political independence and territorial integrity,‖ and Article 2(7) sharply restricts 
intervention‖.27 However, various views have debated the notion of ―Westphalian‖ sovereignty, 
especially with the emergence of internationalism and globalization, whose core values and 
interpretations appear to negate ―Westphalian‖ sovereignty.28  
Early 1990s, ―the United Nations‖ has been endorsing ―political action, usually involving 
military force, which the broad consensus of states would have previously regarded as 
                                                          
23 Sultan Barakat and Steven A. Zyck, “The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery,” Third World Quarterly 30: 6 (2009): 
1069 — 1086. 
24 “Treaty of Westphalia,” retrieved October 30, 2010, 
http://www.schillerinstitute.org/strategic/treaty_of_westphalia.html. 
25 Ibid 
26 “Beyond Intractability,” accessed October 30, 2010, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/sovereignty/. 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
 
 
illegitimate interference in internal affairs.‖29 This has endorsed ―the approval of military 
operations to remedy an injustice within the boundaries of a state or the outside administration of 
domestic matters like police operations.‖30 These actions usually took place without the lacked 
the approval of the target state government:  Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, 
Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, Liberia, are examples of such interventions.
31
 ―The legitimacy and 
wisdom of specific actions and interventions have often been disputed among states.‖32  Such 
interventions as the December 1999 ―U.S. bombing of Iraq and NATO‘s involvement in Kosovo 
failed to elicit U.N. Security Council endorsement‖ for example, the same was true for the 2003 
U.S. invasion of Iraq.  However, ―the broad practice of intervention is likely to continue to enjoy 
broad endorsement within the U.N. Security Council and other international organizations, 
especially when it can be demonstrated that such intervention aims at saving the lives of 
threatened civilians.‖33 The Neo-conservative movement has taken this theory to higher levels, 
by making the assertion that ―a lack of democracy may foreshadow future humanitarian crisis 
and that democracy itself constitutes a human right.‖ 34  Critics of neo-conservatism have noted 
that the movement is concerns itself ―about democracy, human rights, and humanitarian crises in 
the countries‖ that constitute a threat to ―American global dominance, places like the former 
Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, China, Belarus, North Korea, Sudan, and Venezuela, 
while largely ignoring the same issues in other countries considered friendlier to the United 
States, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, Georgia, and 
                                                          
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31Barakat and Zyck, “The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery,” 1069 — 1086. 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 Ibid 
 
 
Colombia‖.35 ―There is a debate about whether recent infringements on state sovereignty like the 
1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and subsequent de facto partition of Kosovo, and the 2003 
Iraq War, reflected these higher principles or whether the real justification was simply self-
defense or the promotion of political and economic interests‖.36 ―Contingent sovereignty‖ seems 
to be surfacing as a new concept in international law, it hasn‘t however yet gotten to the point 
where it is recognized as legitimate‖.37 Whenever failed states are concerned, more criticism of 
―Westphalian‖ sovereignty becomes rampant.  In the case of Afghanistan (before the 2001 US-
led invasion) for example, it was claimed that ―no sovereignty exists and that international 
intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds and on the grounds that the failed states pose a 
threat to neighboring countries and the world as a whole.‖38 
 Since the cold war ended, around one hundred and sixteen armed conflicts have erupted, most of 
which can be classified as civil wars. ―The United Nations Security Council consequently 
launched more than 30 international military interventions‖ aimed at resolving these internal 
conflicts. 
39
 While some of them succeeded others failed, in either case, "nation building" tasks had 
to be dealt with: "to conduct post-conflict reconstruction in failed states.‖40 Some of the carried out 
post-conflict reconstructions either didn‘t succeeded at all, or had doubtful levels of success.  
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan illustrate some of these international military interventions that 
                                                          
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
39 Charles W. Kegley, World Politics Trend and Transformation (Thomson Learning Inc, 2006), 401. 
40 Ibid 
 
 
were thought to be successful, but ongoing post-conflict reconstruction tasks are still not 
accomplished. 
41
 
Following the September 11 attacks, some scholars saw post-conflict recovery intervention as an 
extension of conflict:  ―the subsequent politicization of post-conflict recovery and entry of post-
conflict assistance into the political economy of conflict have fundamentally changed policy 
making and practice.‖ 42 Scholars tend to call for ―de-politicization‖ of post-conflict recovery in 
order ―to benefit from an increasingly structured architecture of integrated, directed recovery.‖ 43 
"It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to 
undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place 
Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the 
Europeans . . . The role of this country [the USA] should consist of 
friendly aid . . . Political passion and prejudice should have no 
part"
44
 
George C Marshall, 5 June 1947 
Sixty years ago, George C Marshall-former US Secretary of State- said that ―the reconstruction 
of war-torn Europe consisted of "friendly aid" given to countries, with certain conditions 
attached specifically on spending the aid on the priorities that the US had identified.‖45 
                                                          
41
 Gintautas Zenkevicius, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Rebuilding Afghanistan.  Is That Post-conflict 
Reconstruction?” Baltic Security & Defence Review Vol. 9 (2007): 28, retrieved March 15, 2010, 
www.bdcol.ee/.../2._Gintautas_Zenkevicius-Post_conflict_reconstruction_in_ Afghanistan.pdf. 
42
 Barakat and Zyck, “The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery,” 1069 — 1086. 
43
 Ibid 
44
 “The Marshall Plan Speech,” retrieved June 24, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/10/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.htm. 
45
 Sultan Barakat, “Post-War Reconstruction and Development: Coming of Age,” in After the 
Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War, ed. Sultan Barakat (London: IB Tauris, 2005), 
13–16.  
  
 
 
The Marshall Plan endorsed an understanding that ―the officials in those countries should guide 
their own recovery.‖46  It also believed that the ―recipient-country leaders required control of 
substantial resources in order to solidify their power and relevance.‖ 47 The Marshall Plan‘s 
strength and success tends to be viewed as the effect of the massive sums spent; around the 
current equivalent of 120 billion USD.
48
  ―The annual per capita levels of assistance provided to 
the Marshall Plan recipient nations of $129 billion USD ―on average, has routinely been 
exceeded‖, although it has not come from a single-donor contribution since then.49 The way 
assistance has been doled out and the priorities put forth by donors has been paramount in 
defining whether a recovery process has succeeded or failed, in all regions of the world from 
―war-ravaged Europe‖, to the ―Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia.‖50 
An examination of 11 countries damaged/destroyed by the war revealed ―that combined non-
military spending during the first two post-conflict years amounted to a net total of nearly $32 
billion, or $1.45 billion per post-conflict zone per year.‖51 ―The actual spending differed widely 
in annual per capita terms, from a low of $24 billon in the Democratic Republic of Congo to a 
high of $679 billion— more than 28 times as much—in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The amounts 
provided in Bosnia were more than five times those supplied through the Marshall Plan.‖52 
                                                          
46 Ibid 
47
  Imanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 2010. 
48 Peter Duignan and L.H., Gann, “The Marshall Plan: history and culture, “Hoover Digest 4 (1997), retrieved 
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The above figures highlight the significance of financial support post-war recovery. It can be 
noted that ―the most successful reconstruction phase have benefited from outstanding levels of 
financial international assistance, like in Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia and Kosovo.‖53 Some of the 
interventions that were deemed less successful, ―such as in DR Congo and Afghanistan‖ were 
not provided with the same high levels of financial international assistance. Funding appears to 
be important; but paradoxes do emerge. 
Following the Second World War, a "relatively adequate spending in Germany and low spending 
in Japan‖ has lead to positive recoveries and development.54  High levels of assistance and non-
military interventions, however gave rise to ―violent breakouts‖ in East Timor and an "extended 
insurgency combined with sectarian in-fighting in Iraq.‖55 Although high levels of aid financing 
are essential, they are not enough to create a successful post-conflict recovery effort. The final 
evaluation of a program‘s success also involves the different modalities used, the way assistance 
is provided, and how different actors are involved.   The sectors to which assistance is doled, and 
to what end, also proves decisive when evaluating the effectiveness of the intervention. 
56
 
It may be best to begin by reviewing the various definitions that shed the light on the ―non-
military interventions in post-conflict countries‖.57  Then we will turn to an analytical history of 
post-conflict recovery that considers the many changes of theory and practice in the past 30 
years. We will also address post-9/11 transformations, given their historical uniqueness. Post-
conflict countries usually encompass various and conflicting political and economic agendas, this 
often results in a difficult to balance array of objectives. In striving to reach these objectives, the 
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recipient state institutions become marginalized, and this creating a danger to the state‘s stability, 
and most importantly to its sovereignty. 
 Defining post-war reconstruction  
The definition of post war reconstruction as viewed by Francis Fukuyama is ―the first 
phase of nation-building, which applies to failed states after violent conflict and where 
international community has to provide security and social support.‖58 He also explains that the 
―second phase of nation-building is the creation of self-sustaining state institutions which 
provide security and all essential needs with the help of the international community.‖59  This 
second phase only becomes possible ―after the completion of the first phase‖ and after assuring 
security and stability.
60
 The third phase involves the strengthening of weak states.
61
 Whenever 
the international community is faced with a failed state and impotent government institutions, 
Post-war intervention is important.  
In 1995, the World Bank was the first to define the term ―post-conflict reconstruction as the 
rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society‖ and the ―reconstruction of the enabling 
conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule 
of law.‖62 The two scholars John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan provided a much broader 
definition to include ―justice, reconciliation and security, which is believed to be central.‖ 63 
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Security includes ―collective and individual security to all actors and addresses all aspects of 
public safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the 
development of legitimate and stable security institutions.‖64 There are seven pillars to security:  
―control of belligerents, territorial security, protection of the populace, protection of key 
individuals, infrastructure and institutions, reform of indigenous security institutions, and 
regional security.‖65 Amongst the important tasks also is the capability to provide security 
because it is only after establishing this objective that other reconstruction tasks can be 
successfully implemented. However, in the absence of justice, socio-economic stabilization and 
good governance, it wouldn‘t be possible to sustain and maintain. 66 
 ―Justice and reconciliation”: This category “addresses the need to deal with past abuses and 
create an impartial legal system‖. 67It also aims at strengthening the justice system for better 
execution of laws in order to prevent future conflicts.  
―Security and governance”: The second category is ―crucial in supporting and providing 
conditions for justice and reconciliation.‖68 In order to sustain a proficient justice system socio-
economic condition needs to be secured beforehand. 
69
 
 ―Social and economic well-being”:  The third category ―addresses fundamental social and 
economic needs, in particular providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the 
population such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and 
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initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program.‖70 This category seeks to provide 
emergency program aiming at providing relief and early recovery for the populations at the 
beginning of post-conflict reconstruction and /or following the end of war. Following the direct 
relief and the rehabilitation of infrastructure, a restoration of lives and livelihoods and 
implementation of social and economic development initiatives is very essential. Nevertheless, 
this can‘t be properly and efficiently accomplished in the absence of a fully-functioning security 
or justice system, in addition to building adequate ―governance‖. 71 
 ―Governance and participation”: this category ―addresses the need to create legitimate and 
effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes.‖72 Specifically, the 
need to ―establish a representative constitutional structure, strengthen public-sector management 
and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation 
of the country‘s government and policies.‖73 
Security however remains paramount in the implementation of democratic governance, if 
institutions and officials are not secured and protected from threatening situations; it creates a 
higher risk of failure for the period following recovery and reconstruction interventions.  
There are four categories of post-war intervention, and there are many different actors 
participating in the implementation of their respective activities: international organizations, 
states, national governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, local 
institutions, local non-governmental organizations, etc… Post conflict reconstruction can be 
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described as best as an intricate and complex endeavor; with different organizations and actors 
harboring their own agendas and goals that may not always be complementary.   
Post-conflict recovery in both practice and as a field of study has proven to be complex. The 
developed studies regarding this subject have overlapped such ―traditional subjects as political 
science, economics, sociology, psychology and history‖, and have included ―various 
interventions undertaken in the name of post-conflict recovery—infrastructure rehabilitation, 
governance, economic development, demilitarization, peace building, women‘s empowerment, 
health, and education‖ among other subjects.74 
The introduction of the notion of ―mission creep‖ which is the expansion of a project or mission 
beyond its original goals, and the identification of new interventions following wars, bring about 
more difficult to define it. ―It would be easier to define it by aims and objectives namely:  to 
reactivate economic and social development . . . [and] to create a peaceful environment that will 
prevent a relapse into violence.‖75 ―Despite widespread agreement upon its literal definition, the 
boundaries between relief, recovery and development are in constant change, and a single post-
conflict context is likely to include several geographical areas and populations at varying stages 
of crisis and development.‖76  No defined criteria therefore have been established for 
differentiating between phases.  Some scholars favors a more expanded definition, which 
―excludes basic, life-sustaining relief activities while seeing itself more closely aligned with 
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questions of local capacity, sustainability and conflict-sensitivity inherent in much contemporary 
development theory and practice.‖77 
In this paper, post war reconstruction will be defined and labeled through the aims of 
interventions.  The concept of ―reconstruction‖ has become very popular, it has however also 
been criticized ―for suggesting a return to the status quo ante which had been implicated in the 
cause of the conflict.‖78 It has been implied that the constructive sponsor was unable to dismantle 
the ―weaknesses and vulnerability factors in the pre-conflict environment.‖79 Consequently, the 
concept of "recovery" became more acceptable because it is used in the economic, social, 
medical and psychological domains, in addition to being far from the infrastructure-oriented 
implications and origins of the term ―reconstruction.‖80 
―A variety of lesser and emerging terms have also been used, including most notably, post-
conflict stabilization.‖ Reflecting modest aims ‗stabilization‘ has been a concept particularly 
endorsed by militaries and by the British government‘s interagency body for post-conflict and 
fragile states, the Stabilization Unit.‖81 This term was born out of the ―war on terror‖ and the 
―subsequent international military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it shows a priority to the 
establishment of basic security, with humanitarian activities serving as force protection and 
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public diplomacy, rather than for more comprehensive civilian domains such as governance and 
socioeconomic development.‖82  The humanitarian aid community holds a different view that 
asserts ―post-conflict development‖ as reflecting the need for post-conflict activities to focus 
around developmental objectives, rather than more politically-oriented concerns such as 
democratization or security sector reform.‖83 
 A backward overview on post-war reconstruction 
Since post-conflict recovery include many actors and a variety of concepts, this paper 
will strive to present an analysis of the history for the major conceptual literature of the 
development of post war recovery theories based upon four criteria assessed by different 
scholars.
84
 The criteria include: ―the primary sectors of activity, the emerging actors, the aims 
objectives and final beneficiaries‖, as well as the conditions imposed on ―recipient state 
institutions and their relationships with international actors.‖85  
 This paper will identify and define three main theories that arose between the 1970s and 2001, 
based on the four criteria previously mentioned.  
 “The Economic Liberalization (and its discontents)”86 
Most of the post-war rehabilitation and recovery processes were undertaken by ―the state 
or states in which the war had occurred‖, but were mainly funded by the USA or the USSR.87  
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The period between end of 1970s and beginning of 1980s saw the rise of the notion of economic 
liberalization as a main component for reconstruction and recovery especially in countries like 
Sudan, Egypt, Mozambique, and Latin America.
88
 
International actors, particularly the "Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF, encouraged (with aid conditionality) the developing and conflict-affected countries‖ to 
implement initiatives aiming at pursuing macroeconomic stability, reinforcing ―trade and capital 
account liberalization‖, and enhancing ―privatization and deregulation‖.89  
These economic transformations relied on a basic assumption ―that the surest foundation for 
peace, both within and between states, is market-democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity 
and a market-oriented economy.‖90 
This plan necessitated undergoing direct contact with the ―recipient state institutions‖, although 
it was ultimately targeted at reducing government ―budgets and wages‖, and in due course at 
marginalizing ―the state‘s involvement in economic and public affairs.‖91  
Some of the same influences that allayed the Cold War were used in this ―intrusive approach‖; 
―structural adjustment has been viewed as a sign of loyalty to liberal democracy and opposition 
to the communist invasion.‖92 Ingenious heads of ―several developing countries‖, however, 
created an equilibrium between U.S and Soviet demands and succeeded in maximizing their 
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―nations‘ access to foreign assistance‖, as well as strengthening and maintaining domestic policy 
autonomy.
93
 
Macroeconomic liberalization and democratization ―often failed to provide the sort of stability 
and economic growth foreseen by their proponents.‖94 In this context, R. Paris in his book 
―Peace building in Central America: reproducing the sources of conflict?” stated that ―structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala sharpened the risk of 
conflict deterioration‖. H. W. Jeong in ―Managing structural adjustment” also implicated IMF 
policies as being a factor in the kickoff of ―conflicts in Sudan in 1985 and Zambia in 1990, as 
well as in civil fighting across West and North Africa.‖95 
―While studies demonstrated that certain implementation arrangements could alleviate SAPs‘ 
potentially harmful influence, criticism against the liberal economic model of development 
started to rise in developing as well as post-conflict countries.‖96 ―Structural adjustment was seen 
as privileging the elite and marginalizing the most vulnerable as international nongovernmental 
humanitarian actors intervened to mitigate the loss of financial assistance from previously state-
controlled economies.‖97 ―Out of this criticism, a ―sustainable human development or people-
centered model emerged.‖98 
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The ―sustainable human development‖ or ―people-centered model‖ approaches mulled over the 
trust that the aim of development intervention is to positively promote the lives and livelihoods of 
the people, enhance participation of communities in developing projects, as well as to sustain a 
strong and ―equal partnership between the developing countries and aid donors.‖99 
The new model foresees a ―consensual partnership between international organizations, donors, 
recipient governments, and civil society organizations‖.100 This model was of a great importance 
and had influence over post-conflict ―environments in Latin America and Southeast Asia.‖ 101 
This trend was strongly reflected in the rise of social funds provided by international donors to 
locals or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the sake of implementing development 
projects aimed at improving the communities. Economic liberalization and the consequent 
appearance of grassroots development ―provided complementary interventions but ones which 
worked at cross purposes and which were implemented by culturally incompatible 
institutions.‖102 A more unified modality was needed to meet ―the challenges‖ of developing 
conflict ridden-countries in the face of emerging tensions related to the ending the Cold War, and 
the onset of a succession of new armed clashes. Thus a new phase emerged. 
 “Post-cold war challenges to sovereignty”103 
―The failure of polarizing cold war tensions led to the outbreak of a series of conflicts. As 
external support was cut, state power weakened in many countries and calls for autonomy and 
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self-determination proliferated.‖104  Thirty two internecine wars broke out in the 1990s. On a 
worldwide level, fifty six armed conflicts came to an end between 1989 and 2000. 
105
  
Consequently, what once was the communist bloc was now beginning to disintegrate and new 
countries were being formed. Post-conflict interventions began to increase in number and scope 
as new notions of state began to emerge. Newly-formed states with ethnically diverse 
populations like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, were perceived as ―unworthy of the 
sovereignty with which the Westphalian system had endowed them‖ 106 since they were unable 
to contain ethnic violence and genocide within their borders. This is viewed in ―the rise of 
international administrations within war-torn countries and in the controversial intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999.‖107  The ―grassroots backlash to economic liberalization withered and 
humanitarian as well as strategically-oriented actors united around an interventionist impulse.‖ 
108
 It was in this period that post-conflict recovery activities gained momentum.  International 
actors with peacekeeping forces began what would be called the "disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration (DDR)‖ of ex-opponents.109  ―Security Sector Reform (SSR)‖ was also 
introduced in this period as one of the ―core activities in post-conflict contexts.‖110 
Non Governmental Organizations however still controlled most post-conflict activities, and 
according to ―the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)‖ records, ―the 
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number of international NGOs‖ grew by 123% from 1990 to 2000.‖111 ―The number of multi-
strata NGOs with global operations increased from 36 to 120 in that same period.‖112 These 
organizations launched a series of interventions aimed at enhancing peace-building and crisis 
prevention, as well as ensuring social equity. ―Justice reform‖ as a concept began to grow with 
the understanding ―that the root causes of conflict rested in the legacy of past injustices.‖113 
Interferences with economic aspects persisted to concentrate on ―liberalization, and 
privatization‖ but they also expanded to include ―livelihood activities and governance 
strengthening.‖114 Although programs ―were frequently conducted in the name of peace, 
equitable development, and justice the rising number of NGOs, the expansion of their mandates 
and their financing by international institutions meant that recipient states were commonly 
relegated to observer status  in much of their countries‘ recovery.‖115 
The question of ―good governance‖116 rose in prominence regardless of the lessening role 
undertaken ―by recipient states.‖117 It became obvious that the ―previously-assumed link between 
structural adjustment, increased social spending, liberal democracy and good governance had 
lost much of its credibility.‖118 Some scholars such as Adrian Leftwich, raised the issue of the 
―relationship between democratization and economic growth‖, and claimed that "nonconsensual 
and non-democratic measures may often be essential in the early stages of developmental 
sequences in laying the foundations for growth—and also sustainable democracy in the long 
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run.‖119Three other scholars, John Brohman, Reginald Herbold, and Ismail Ahmed not only 
doubted ―democratic approaches‖ but also believed that ―the solution in the empowerment of 
pre-conflict traditional models of governance, participatory or not, which would have greater 
local validity than imported Western models.‖120 As often happens with foremost model changes 
a new era or phase of post-conflict recovery was ushered in based on the many questions about 
the model that had been used in the late 1980‘s and the 1990‘s.  121 
 “Humble consociationalism‖122 
In the late 1990s, the final phase rises, and has since become a primarily academic ideal 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Interventions now needed to show appropriate 
concern and view the imposing of fundamental modernization plans ―regarding gender, social 
equity, hierarchies, governance, and economics‖ with skepticism.123 Operating with ―what 
already exists and within the limits of established institutional arrangements was seen as most 
important, particularly in relation to governance and the state.‖124 Major socio-economic and 
political transformations became regarded as a ―multi-generational process for which recovery 
can merely plant the seeds.‖125 This phase is all about emphasizing ―consociationalism or 
collaborative governance that involves the recipient state and local civil society‖ in the first 
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place, and the international community second.
126
 This meant that ―rather than participatory 
rapid appraisals (PRAs) which invite individuals from conflict-affected countries to engage in 
foreign-led processes, the international post-conflict recovery establishment ought to be 
requesting permission to support a locally-owned process: ultimate authority ought to rest with 
local actors within communities, local NGOs, and all layers of the public sector.‖127 This phase‘s 
standards materialized in the form of additional ―post-conflict reconstruction trust funds‖.128  
Many institutions also strove to ―centralize external assistance‖ to give the recipient state a 
certain amount of flexibility in determining how the funds would be managed regardless of the 
specific donor conditions.
129
 ―Trust funds have been subject to flawed implementation as have 
many of this phase‘s concepts and recommendations: with short-term deadlines, heavily tied 
contributions, and more donor than recipient involvement.‖130 
Afghanistan, where the warnings of various scholars went unheeded, proved to be the case where 
a rising insurgency hampered the initial successes. In 2002, the “Third World Quarterly” issued 
a review on Afghanistan‘s rehabilitation and recovery. A paper by Sultan Barakat highlighted 
potential harms that could rise from similar plans which are "running ahead of Afghan 
preparedness and pre-empting the process of national negotiation and decision making.‖131 
Other authors further highlighted the constituent elements of this modest approach to 
Afghanistan‘s recovery which include:  utilizing ―a learning-process approach‖, to allow new 
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―home-grown‖ models of governance to develop rather than imposing Western models, and to 
allow Afghan women to set their own definition and pace for social change.‖132 
By ignoring the lessons learned from previous experiences that tried to force an ―externally 
defined recovery agenda‖ the security situation quickly turned to the worse. After 2002, ―the 
number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks rose by nearly 6000%, annual international 
military fatalities more than tripled as well.‖133 
The eradication of poppy, the main source of income for rural farmers, made the process 
deteriorate even more. Adding to that civilian deaths caused by counter insurgency tactics and 
problems beginning to solidify as a result of wider inclination in post-war reconstruction that 
took place in the former eight years, mainly following the September 11 attacks. 
134
 
The approach toward carrying out post-war reconstruction at, and not after conflicts, has been a 
very significant shift that has an effect on the occurrence and the types of interventions. 
 ―The evolving nature of peace agreements, which have involved only some relevant 
stakeholders, has resulted in the generation of extended insurgencies rather than the sort of 
smaller-scale spoiler violence seen at the tail end of conflicts in the 1990s.‖135  By beginning to 
implement activities that are usually associated with post-conflict recover at an earlier stage of 
the conflict, or before the conflict is resolved, what was meant to be ‗humanitarian‘ assistance 
started to feel the conflict as part of its political economy. Some scholars argue that whereas the 
first start of recovery activities was noted to provide a ―peace dividend‖ and ―demonstrate the 
                                                          
132
 Ibid 
133Barakat, ―Understanding Afghanistan,‖ 3. 
134Steven A. Zyck, ―Former Combatant Reintegration and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan,‖ Conflict, 
Security & Development 9 (2009): 111–131. 
135Understanding Afghanistan: Political Economy Analysis,‖ retrieved March 12, 2010, 
http://www.cowiprojects.com/FSDC/files/DFID_Understanding_Afghanistan_12_PEA_Lit_Review_03Dec08.pdf. 
 
 
benefits of maintained stability, the targeting of initial assistance towards the most violent areas 
has produced perverse incentives.‖136  These perverse incentives manifested in the continuation 
of violence in recovery areas, as well as spread of violence to relatively ―peaceful regions (in 
places such as Afghanistan) to permit and attract insurgent activity, in hopes of maximizing 
access to resources.‖137 
―This development represents perhaps the most troubling evolution in post-conflict recovery if, 
indeed, it may be termed as such, rather than being more appropriately labeled mid-conflict 
stabilization.‖138  No in depth reviews have yet been conducted on the results and implications of 
having ―humanitarian‖ aid actors in the midst of an ongoing conflict.  The safety of aid workers 
in these situations, as well as ―the challenges of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) are 
predominant in the literature.‖139 The military has been assuming most responsibilities whenever 
‗reconstruction assistance‘ is placed in highly volatile situations, ―particularly through the sorts 
of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) established first in Afghanistan and shortly 
thereafter in Iraq.‖140 
The PRT model‘s effectiveness has been criticized in the literature as well ―and examples of 
inappropriate interventions (schools built in inappropriate locations and without the benefit of 
teachers) have proliferated.‖141  Thus, the military has become yet another player in the post-
conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations.
142
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―Private security companies (PSCs)‖ and ―private military companies (PMCs)‖ started to take on 
a major role in post-conflict recovery after 2001.
143
  These mostly Western enterprises were a 
principal supplement to the international forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, PMCs even engaged in 
dynamic operations
144
.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina and other areas, they provided training to newly-
formed police and military forces. 
145
 While reviewing the rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
Iraq, one should notice the strong role of private companies played in this particular phase, as 
well as the alongside engagement of many non-governmental organizations in the planning 
period before the intervention in post-war Iraq.
146
 The process of developing strategies for post-
war stead-fasting reconstruction and recovery proved to be a distinctive and debatable timing. ―It 
has been fraught with concerns that pre-war planning and the provision of a deluge of 
humanitarian assistance following conflict may lead to the perceived sanitization of warfare 
(and, hence, the development of a constituency in Western countries which views conflict as at 
least a partially humanitarian activity).‖147 The failures of this process however, are equally 
important; reviews of studies have revealed this failure to result from the failure of inhabitant 
and military players to coordinate, ―the initial unwillingness of the US military to play a role in 
post-combat peacekeeping or reconstruction operations, the absence of [emergency] planning, 
and the inability to comprehend the challenges and nuances of post-conflict environments.‖148 
Among the  different actors participating in the implementation of the post war reconstruction 
activities are international organizations such as the UNDP, whose work fits into one of the 
above mentioned post war recovery processes.  This international agency aims at initiating 
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implementations to improve the lives and livelihoods of the people, enhance participation of 
communities in developing projects, as well as ensure sustainable development, and peace 
building in the intervened countries, as stated in its general framework and mandate. The 
international organization seems to mostly endorse the first two theories identified early in this 
chapter. The ―economic liberalization‖ which calls for improving economic conditions, pursuing 
economic stability in order to maintain democracy in post conflict areas, the rise of the notion of 
state sovereignty, and the ―emerging of new types of interventions‖ aiming at enhancing peace 
building, ensuring good governance, and preventing crisis.
149
 The work of the international 
organization in general, and the UNDP in specific, is mostly aimed at promoting development, 
especially in challenging conditions such as wars and disasters.  Thus it fits two models 
mentioned above, especially since the identified aims and objectives in those models correspond 
to the overall objectives of international organizations, and specifically the UNDP‘s mandate. 
Nevertheless, there are several challenges that result in a post conflict scene: weakened state 
capacity, destroyed physical, human, and social capital, distorted economic incentives, 
widespread poverty and massive unemployment. International organizations, namely the UN and 
its agencies, therefore abide by their policies and aims, and find it crucial to recognize the 
implications of conflicts, and the necessity to design strategies and programs to provide 
assistance and intervene in order to provide the proper support for war torn countries, where 
support is more highly required and essential than in simply poor or undeveloped countries.
150
 
The international organizations usually work with ―different notions of recovery‖; the World 
Bank for instance, addresses this notion with regards to ―the rebuilding of the socio-economic 
framework of society‖ and ―the reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning 
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peacetime society, explicitly including governance and rule of law as essential components.‖ 151 
The UNDP on the other hand, stresses ―capacity development‖ and further defines recovery as 
―the process of return from instability and conflict to a normal development trajectory, where a 
country has reacquired the capability to make and implement economic policy as part of a 
largely self-sustaining process of economic governance.‖ 152 
In this paper, we will strictly recognize the UNDP‘s role in post conflict recovery; more 
precisely, the following chapters will approach the agency‘s intervention in Lebanon specifically 
in Beirut Southern Suburbs following the July 2006 war.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CHALLENGES CREATED BY THE JULY 2006 WAR 
Introduction 
 ―Pre-conflict‖ or ―pre-disaster planning‖ for post-conflict conditions though has a huge 
potential to facilitate better ―humanitarian responses‖, it can guide to ―the adoption of boilerplate 
interventions which are unable to account for specific effects of an individual crisis.‖153 ―As a 
result of the topic's rising visibility and because of the concentration of some of the world's most 
protracted conflicts in the Middle East and broader Muslim world new donor countries have 
emerged to great effect.‖154 
―These donors have the potential to increase, or at least maintain, global recovery and 
development spending in the face of declining contributions from the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member 
countries.‖155 
 After the July 2006 Lebanon war Saudi Arabia infused $600 million USD into the country, and 
following the war on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009, it also pledged an additional $1 
billion, half of the total amount needed for the rehabilitation phase.
156
 ―Such figures are all the 
more startling considering that Saudi Arabia‘s official, bilateral development spending amounted 
to only $58.1 million in 2003.‖157  The period of 2003 till 2007,‖the total annual non-DAC donor 
                                                          
153 Ibid 
154Ibid 
155
“DAC Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS),” retrieved 14 September 2010, 
http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. 
156
Interview with a senior figure at the Council of Development and Reconstruction on September 10, 2010, and 
information concerning Saudi contributions to the reconstruction of Gaza is from: BBC UK, retrieved 19 January 
2010http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7918105.stm,  
157
Adele Harmer and Lin Cotterrell, “Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Face of Official Humanitarian Aid,” 
(Humanity Policy Grpup research report, London, September 2005). 
 
 
contributions to Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq, increased from $108 million to $547 million, 
with China and India beginning to play major roles.‖158  
Gulf State donors (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait) not only infused considerable financial 
resources into the area, but they also did so with a high degree of cultural and, in particular cases, 
religious contextual familiarity.
159
  ―These donors however still have to integrate themselves 
with multilateral bodies and NGOs which they have shunned in favor of more visible bilateral 
contributions and non-traditional donors‘ approaches, such as cash transfers for owner-driven 
housing reconstruction in southern Lebanon, [that brings] the sort of simplicity, [limited] 
conditionality, and low delivery costs which many traditional international actors abandoned 
long ago.‖160 
Many scholars have argued that post war interventions in Lebanon were dictated by a 
combination of ambitions, concerns, interests and objectives.  There was also concern about what 
was behind the so-called proclaimed objectives, which aspiring to recover and rehabilitate the 
country and the livelihoods of the communities, and whether their main purpose was indeed a 
continual interests, or a specific hidden political agenda for each and every post-war intervention 
actor.  
This chapter will attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the various interventions 
undertaken by the various actors in Beirut Southern Suburbs in the period post the July 2006 
war, with an overview of major donors and financing mechanism.  In the following chapter we 
will specifically illustrate the United Nations Development Program‘s intervention in the area, 
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by finally assessing the implications of those initiatives and by providing an examination of the 
overall objectives and projects implemented by the agency in the area. 
 
July 2006 war on Lebanon: Impacts and results 
 
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah launched a rocket attack on Israel which resulted in the 
killing of eight Israelis and the kidnapping of two.
161
 Israel responded by attacking Hezbollah 
sites and areas with the majority of Shiites residents. 
The 33-day Israeli war on the country in summer 2006 resulted in severe harm to private and 
public infrastructure, transportation networks, schools, hospitals, housing, businesses and trade. 
It further aggravated the already existing poverty and created ―below standards‖ socio economic 
conditions due to destruction, loss of lives, and as importantly loss of livelihoods in different 
areas of Lebanon. The hostilities lead to the destruction and damage of 125,000 housing units, 
612 public schools, 80 private schools, 97 bridges and several hospitals.
162
 The human toll was 
overwhelming: Over 1,200 Lebanese were killed, one-third of them children, and more than 
5,000 were wounded, and hundreds of whom were left with permanent disabilities, while more 
than 1000 people were internally displaced. 
163
An estimated 100,000 people, mainly youths, 
emigrated. The July 2006 destruction estimated at 4 billion USD, with an additional 6 billion 
USD in indirect costs.
164
 The war affected the overall living standards, especially in the 
marginalized areas in Lebanon. The regions that were most directly and indirectly affected by the 
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war are the same as those that have historically witnessed the highest poverty rate in the country: 
namely South Lebanon, the Beirut Southern Suburbs and the Bekaa. The indirect effect of the 
war on the economy also exacerbated the conditions of extreme poverty in those regions. The 
cost of reconstruction was estimated by the government to be in the order of $2.8 billion USD.
165
 
The attack on Lebanon lead to a direct and harsh impact in the socio-economic conditions and 
almost affected all the sectors; a sharp slowdown marked the economy and worsened further 
following the war.  
The July 2006 war had also severely affected the environment. The attack on ―Jiyyeh power 
plant‖ created an environmental disaster with short and longer-term consequences on the lives 
and livelihoods in various sectors of the economy. 15,000 tons of oil spilled into the sea and 
along the coast. 20,000 tons of burning fuel over a period of 20 days rendered the atmosphere 
toxic.
166
 In 2006 Lebanon‘s ranking in the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) dropped 
from 36 (out of 133 countries) to 90, according to the updated indices for 2008 and 2010.
167
  The 
World Bank validated this fact through undertaking environmental degradation repair work 
following the July 2006 hostilities. The destruction of buildings and other concrete structures 
produced nearly 3 million cubic meters of rubble and other demolition waste.
168
 
―The unexploded ordinance (UXO), particularly cluster munitions‖, caused a barrier to the return 
of displaced citizens and to the rehabilitation process. ―The United Nations estimated 4 million 
cluster bombs were dropped‖ in South Lebanon, the bulk of them after the Security Council had 
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adopted a resolution on August 11 stipulating that the end of hostilities will take effect on 
August14.
169
   
 
The Impact on Beirut Southern Suburbs: 
Beirut Southern Suburbs is a densely populated area with an estimated resident population 
of 800,000.
170
 The population, predominantly Shiite, originates mainly from the Bekaa and South 
of Lebanon from which they were forced to migrate due to the Israeli occupation of the South from 
1978 to 2000.
171
  The inadequate urban planning and the rapid expansion of the Beirut Southern 
Suburbs left its resident population in dismal socio-economic conditions.  
Moreover, the summer war deteriorated the livelihoods of the population mainly in terms of 
unemployment, student dropout rates, and consequently the outbreak of social problems. 
The 2006 summer war resulted in major losses and claimed many lives in addition to the extensive 
damage to the physical and socio-economic infrastructure. This disrupted the local governance‘s 
capacity to deliver social and economic services. Severe structural and infrastructure damage in 
Beirut Southern Suburbs affected the transportation networks, schools, hospitals, housing, small 
and medium enterprises, and some large businesses.  The hostilities totally destroyed 250 buildings 
in Beirut Southern Suburbs: 220 in Haret Hreik, 16 in Chiah, 12 in Borj Al, Barajneh, and 2 in 
Ghobeiri. Haret Hreik was one of the areas hardest hit in the 2006 war, with more than 75% of the 
destruction of the Beirut Southern Suburbs in the area.
172
 5,000 housing units were totally ruined; 
including 4000 in Haret Hreik. More than 8,000 housing units were damaged beyond repair, and 
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more than 8,000 housing units were partially damaged in Beirut Southern Suburbs.
173
 An estimate 
of 40,000 persons were displaced from this area, and four bridges (3 in Haret Hreik, 1 in 
Ghobeiry), and roads were totally destroyed or damaged beyond repair.
174
 The destruction and 
hostilities in Beirut Southern Suburbs caused large amounts of rubble and debris to block road 
access to houses and small and medium enterprises. 
It also leads to the loss of employment throughout the whole area due to the destruction of around 
2,500 Small and Medium Enterprises. The highest percentage of affected livelihoods was 
perceived to have happened in Haret Hreik.
175
  
The Israeli aggression also significantly affected the livelihood of fishermen in Lebanon 
particularly those at the port in Ouzai, where an entire fleet of 300 fishing boats was destroyed and 
fish nets and other equipment of more than 250 fishermen were irreparably damaged.
176
 
The conflict and subsequent reconstruction process has reshaped the socio-economic context of 
Beirut Southern Suburbs. The most reliable statistics concerning the area comes from the United 
Nations Development Program, who conducted in close partnership with CAS (Central 
Administration for Statistics) and ILO (International Labor Organization), a post-war living 
conditions assessment showing the following findings for the Beirut Southern Suburbs: 
Table 3.1: Post War Living Conditions Assessment 
Percentage Beirut Southern 
Suburbs 
Other areas 
Families living in 1 Room only 29.6% 14.7% Lebanon as a whole 
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Those seeking immigration 22% 14% in BSS in 2004. 
Beneficiaries of health insurance 45.1% 64.1% in Beirut 
Dependence on artesian wells  
as primary water source 
27% 3.2% in the South (the least affected areas) 
Enrolment of Youth  
(age range: 15-19) in schools 
67.6% 82.2% in Mt. Lebanon 
Unemployment 18%  11.6% in Mt. Lebanon 
Working power (age 15+) 11.0%  
Female: 7.7%  
Male: 12.1%) 
32.7% (female: 42.4% and male: 29.5%) in  
Mt. Lebanon 
Working in Public sector 7% 26.9% in Mt. Lebanon 
Children in the family Two thirds of the total number of children of Lebanon. 
 
Reconstruction challenges:  
 
Lebanon‘s intricate political situation posed a crucial reconstruction challenge: mainly in 
the absence of public trust in the government, namely among the Shiites. ―This had implications 
for joined up thinking in postwar reconstruction, and the ability of short-term reconstruction to 
fit into longer-term development plans.‖177  
Additionally, many international players were not seen as ―politically‖ impartial, creating more 
challenges to their efforts; many adversaries of the Lebanese authority, for example, viewed the 
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United Nations as a fervent body or agency.
178
 This was mainly due to their opposition to the UN 
investigation into the killing of ex-premier Rafic Hariri, an investigation that was viewed as 
having political implications and motivations. ―Some also regarded the UNIFIL as acting as a 
proxy security force for Israel and resented those parts of Resolution 1701 which would curtail 
Hezbollah‘s activities.‖179  Some INGOs and NGOs were also viewed as ―partisan, or in receipt 
of resources from tainted sources‖ such as the case of USAID.180 The complications arose from 
perceptions that the reconstruction actors are not impartial, and ―extended to the ability of some 
INGOs to work with Hezbollah.‖181  ―While Lebanon was relatively fortunate in that many 
NGOs and international reconstruction actors were already present, or arrived very shortly after 
the hostilities ceased, this multiplicity of reconstruction actors constituted a coordination 
[nuisance and lead to a duplication of work in many cases]. There were also concerns associated 
with the lack of local knowledge held by some INGO representatives.‖ 182 
One final yet very important reconstruction challenge, and arguably opportunity, was the existing 
state of underdevelopment in Lebanon.  The existing state presented a reconstruction opportunity 
in that reconstruction endeavors could have a larger impact since they were starting from a low 
threshold and would tentatively be able to incorporate the unimplemented existing development 
plans. The difficulty lay in needs assessment, since the lines between the required aid for post 
war reconstruction and the pre-existing damage from previous conflicts, underdevelopment, or 
standard neglect were often blurred. ―This confused strata of Destruction from multiple conflicts 
and a normal underdevelopment hampered the prioritization of reconstruction efforts. There was 
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also a confused strata of construction and reconstruction in that much of the building work on-
going in southern Lebanon (for example, the construction of large houses by members of the 
Diaspora) had been planned before the war and could be classed as construction rather than 
reconstruction.‖183 
 
Reconstruction opportunities  
Beside the former challenges discussed, some opportunities can be highlighted. 
Lebanon‘s experience regarding reconstruction is not recent. Due to previous internal clashes 
(the Lebanese civil war) and previous violent conflicts, particularly Israelis invasions and 
occupation of Lebanese territories, people were to a certain extent familiar with reconstruction 
challenges. The series of the abovementioned major conflicts have not only shaken the country, 
but have also increased the human, economic and infrastructure vulnerability. As such, a 
reconstruction process provided an opportunity to strengthen the country‘s infrastructure as well 
as its institutional arrangements. Second, The United Nations has been active in the country as of 
1978.
184
 Third, Lebanon boasts a ―strong civil society and thus possessed many of the coping 
mechanisms and elements of social capital required for reconstruction.‖ 185 This meant that 
―relief assistance could be accelerated and international and local actors could concentrate on 
longer-term reconstruction and development.‖186  Finally, Lebanon benefits from a strong 
Diaspora (estimated at 18 million) which to a certain extent supports the local economy.
187
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Reconstruction players in the reconstruction process 
In response to the war, many actors from within Lebanon, the region, and the 
international community intervened to provide support and rehabilitation to the affected areas 
and communities, including Beirut Southern Suburbs. However, the diversity of reconstruction 
players implies emergence of potential competition problems, and duplication as well as can lead 
to absence of proper communication amongst the diverse actors.
188
 
The principal actors in the reconstruction process in Lebanon in July 2006 included several 
actors who were invited to provide support to the reconstruction phase, in addition to the 
Lebanese government was responsible for dealing with the consequences of the war. These 
players included state donors from the west, many state donors from the Arab World, and 
international organizations such as the UNDP, in addition to international and local NGOs. 
On August 14, 2006, after the acceptance of resolution 1701 and the end of hostilities, the 
―Reconstruction and Recovery Cell‖, that was attached to the Office of the Prime Minister 
sustained by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), went into operation and set out 
to prioritize requirements for early recovery in preparation for an international donor conference 
which Sweden‘s Prime Minister had offered to convene in Stockholm on August 31, 2006.189 
The Government of Lebanon immediately responded with a number of measures, including the 
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provision of relief supplies from existing government stocks, organizing the humanitarian effort, 
and engaging the international community to provide support.
190
 
In August 2006 and immediately after the fighting ended, Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah in a televised appearance pledged that ―his organization would help to rebuild homes 
and compensate those whose homes had been destroyed‖.191  ―A week after Nasrallah‘s pledge to 
compensate war victims, the United States President George W. Bush announced that the US 
would provide 230 million USD in reconstruction assistance.‖ 192 
Two important roles were undertaken by in the ―international community‖ including western 
states, international organizations and ‗financial institutions‘ in the post-war recovery phase: the 
first role was backing the Lebanese government financially and politically and secondly, the 
international community provided ―security guarantees to allow reconstruction to proceed, 
through the United Nations and other international organizations.‖193 
On August 31, 2006, and due to the challenges facing the Lebanese state to handle the 
reconstruction process, the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon‘s Early Recovery allocates 900 
million USD in ―reconstruction pledges from EU members, Arab countries, and Japan‖, bringing 
the total amount of funds allocated towards the rebuilding of Lebanon to $1.2 billion USD.
194
 
The largest donors were Qatar contributing with more than  ―more than 33%, the Arab Fund for 
Economic & Social Development with around 13%, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with 6.7%, 
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while the European Commission (EC)‘s contributions—European Commission Humanitarian 
Aid Office (ECHO) and non-ECHO—represented 10 %  and those of the US approximately six 
per cent of the total.‖195 Few months later, in January 2007, another conference, Paris III, was 
also held to support the Lebanese state, pledging as such around $6.7 billion for the purpose of 
undertaking administrative and economic reforms, as well as managing the public debt.
196
 
However, the immediate intervention, following the cessation of hostilities, in terms of 
reconstruction the affected areas was undertaken by Jihad Al Binaa, Hizbullah‘s reconstruction 
unit.
197
 
It is worth noting that as soon as the hostilities ended in August 2007, the existing internal 
political division between the two blocs 14 March and 8 March, were escalated, leading to more 
political and sectarian fractions. 
198
  
This division was clearly reflected in the battle between the government (and its 14 March camp 
supporters) and Hizbullah (and its 8 March supporters) over reconstructing the affected areas, 
and specifically over the housing sector compensation mechanism.  
In this regards, the state mechanism for assessment and compensation was established by the 
Prime Minister‘s office. ―It involved damage assessments by the Council of the South or the 
Ministry of the Displaced, auditing of these assessments by Khatib & Alami, and distribution of 
compensation money.‖199 
However, the delay in disbursing the first payment of compensation to inhabitants provoked 
criticism. For instance, As- Safir, a local Lebanese pro-8 March newspaper, published an article 
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in February 4, 2008 highlighting on the delay and the complaints arising where Hizbullah‘s 
representative Hassan Fadlallah ―accused the government of spending $ 10 million of the funds 
initially allocated to the reconstruction of housing units on infrastructure projects in other regions 
(including $ 40 million for the Arab highway in the Bekaa valley).‖ 200Moreover, Waad‘s 
director, Hassan Jachi, ―declared that only 50% of the beneficiaries have received the first 
installment, and accuses the government of deliberately delaying payment in view of creating 
tensions between the inhabitants and Hezbollah. Such claims were denied by the government.‖201 
However, disputes were intensified over the reimbursement of the second installment. Following 
the announcement of HRC‘s Secretary General, General Yahya Raad, reagrding ―the difficulty of 
providing payment for the second phase, a controversy arose regarding the usage of the grants 
allocated to housing.‖202 ―The government denies this, and defended itself by a (relatively late) 
publication of the latest numbers regarding the use of funds.‖203More of the disputes arose over 
the pace of construction in South Lebanon, where the process has also been slow in the area, 
partially because of delays in payments to beneficiaries.
204
 
In the months and years following the July 2006 war, an emerging presence of non-Western 
actors evolved into ―the non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)‖, where countries such 
as Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia emerged as important actors in the country‘s 
rehabilitation process.
205
 
Post-conflict actors support was channeled to Lebanon, including Beirut Southern Suburbs, for 
two main purposes: 1) ―compensation payments for damaged private housing‖, 2) ―implementing 
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reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, such as repairing damaged infrastructure‖, as well as 
providing support to local authorities, namely municipalities and local affected communities.
206
 
Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar provided funds to the two facets. ―Donors could sponsor a project 
directly (such as the reconstruction of a bridge), lodge a payment with the government‘s account 
in the Central Bank of Lebanon, and/or provide in-kind contributions (such as, replacement of 
equipment for schools).‖ 207 Most noteworthy was that different donors followed different 
methods which resulted in an intricate donor environment.  
Most of the non-western donors such as Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates signed protocols with the Lebanese government, and opted for either ―opening accounts 
at the Lebanese Central Bank or routing funds through the Higher Relief Commission (HRC), 
located in the prime minister‘s office.‖208 Iran, who has direct ties to Hezbollah, side stepped the 
government and set up the Iranian Contributory Organization for Reconstructing Lebanon 
(ICORL) and ―worked through the municipalities, the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR), and the relevant ministries.‖209 
The funds from the Gulf States and Iran to Beirut Southern Suburbs aimed at supporting and 
rehabilitating the damages in terms of infrastructure, rehabilitation of public schools, ports, 
namely Ouzai Port, and provision of support to municipalities. 
The overall aim of the Kuwaiti pledges for Beirut Southern Suburbs was to not only assist in 
rehabilitating the damaged areas, but also to assist in nationwide development.
210
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After the August 2006 ceasefire, Iran stated its willingness to provide support to all destroyed 
and affected regions with no limited ceiling for funding.  It seems to have carried through with 
its promises, since senior figures at local municipalities in the area of the Beirut Southern 
Suburbs estimate a hefty amount.  It is worth noting that even as Iran was granted an enormous 
reconstruction presence, no spoken statement was ever stated on the total pledges provided to the 
country. 
The United Arab Emirates has also been an actor by adopting 20 schools in Beirut Southern 
suburbs, and funding the rehabilitation of the Ouzai Port.
211
 
Finally, Jihad al Binaa (JaB), a privately funded NGO linked to Hezbollah, provided a range of 
assistance primarily in southern Lebanon but did engage in some direct reconstruction activities 
in Beirut Southern Suburbs, where it primarily focused on public infrastructure.
212
 Waad is Jihad 
al Binaa‘s project to reconstruct Southern Beirut. This project extends over 0.4 square kilometers 
and its value is estimated at USD 370 million.
213
 It is financed both by the money allocated by 
the state to the inhabitants and by Hezbollah.
214
 The project aimed to rebuild damaged homes, 
businesses, and public buildings. In addition, the project reorganized traffic to make the area 
more accessible to pedestrians, to improve traffic flow, and to allow for green spaces.
215
  
However, there have been complaints about slow construction, which sparked debates between 
Jihad al Binaa and the government. Hassan Jachi, the director of Jihad al Binaa, asserted that the 
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problems are not related to Waad, and accused the government of delaying payments in order to 
create problems between Hezbollah and the inhabitants.
216
 
In contrast to the Arab donors, western donors were more concerned with governance and 
livelihoods programs. The UNDP is a major body for governance & livelihoods support in 
Lebanon, the European Commission however is also one the major funding agency and 
supportive of UNDP‘s governance initiatives. ―UNDP outsources much governance activity to 
NGOs.‖217 It is important to note that in following the summer war, ―European donors either 
maintained their pre-existing governance programs or engaged in only small-scale reconstruction 
assistance.‖218 
―The international community was more directly involved in Lebanon‘s reconstruction through 
the United Nations and its agencies. While the UN military forces had minimal reconstruction 
funds allowing for a limited number of quick impact projects, their main contribution was to 
provide a secure environment in [the whole country] which other UN agencies—notably UNDP 
and UNICEF—could partake in hands-on reconstruction. UNDP provided vital coordination 
functions—especially in the initial relief phase of post-war interventions, while UNICEF was 
particularly involved in repairing damaged water and sewerage infrastructure.‖219 
Among the United Nations agencies, funds, and programs in Beirut Southern Suburbs we can list 
WHO, UNFPA and UNHCR, WFP who responded immediately by reorienting their program 
priorities in light of the unfolding humanitarian crisis, and in anticipation of the recovery needs 
that to be met after the conflict in the damaged areas, including Beirut Southern Suburbs.   
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Although UNDP is not a humanitarian relief organization, it was able to respond immediately to 
the unfolding humanitarian crisis because of the structure of its presence in Lebanon: with three 
sub-offices in the South, Mount Lebanon and the North and its main office in Beirut Southern 
Suburbs, as well as its ongoing ―partnerships with government and local communities‖ in 
development programs and projects, and the stock of its earlier experience in the period prior to 
and following the Taef Agreement. 
220
 
The United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT) was among the international 
organizations that were also involved in shelter, though not housing compensation, in Lebanon 
and particularly Beirut Southern Lebanon. UN-HABITAT implemented projects in most affected 
areas that helped thousands recover from the 2006 war. In Beirut Southern Suburbs area, UN-
HABITAT initiated an intervention financed by the ―European Union humanitarian aid 
department (ECHO)‖, costing approximately 700,000 Euros, in Hey El Soulloum.221 The UN 
agency teamed up with the Municipality of Choueifat, the Social Affairs Ministry and the local 
neighborhood committees and took on the rehabilitation of building and communal infrastructure 
in the above mentioned area
222
. The Paris-based INGO, the Agency for Technical Cooperation 
and Development (ACTED), was involved in implementing the above mentioned program. 
223
 
A number of NGOs (around 20) also conducted livelihoods support in the area (e.g. Mercy 
Corps, International Relief and Development, the Italian NGO ROSS, Handicap International, 
etc…).224 NGO initiatives included interventions on small cash-grants to business, support to 
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women, income generation activities and support to public works.
225
 INGOs‘ role in Lebanon 
was important, specifically in Beirut southern suburbs‘ immediate post-war relief. ―The 
advantage of this was the professionalism, and the technical and logistical‖ proficiency aimed at 
meeting local needs and avoided duplication of some projects due to lack of coordination among 
the different actors on the field.
226
 
The following Chapter will widely elaborate on the UNDP‘s intervention in Beirut Southern 
Suburbs post the July 2006 war, and more precisely it will focus on the major interventions 
undertaken by UNDP and the International donors which funded those initiatives.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
            THE UNDP IN LEBANON 
 
Introduction 
 
 UNDP is the ―United Nations' global development network, an organization 
advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help 
people build a better life.‖227 In 1965, the UNDP was established ―to combine the Expanded 
Program of Technical Assistance‖ and the ―United Nations Special Fund‖.228 In 1971, through 
the implementation of the general assembly resolution 2029 (XX), ―the two organizations were 
fully combined into the UNDP.‖229 The UNDP is active in 166 countries, providing support ―on 
global and national development challenges‖, as well developing local capacity.230 The UNDP is 
―an executive board within the United Nations General Assembly, and its administrator is the 
third highest ranking official of the United Nations after the United Nations Secretary-General 
and Deputy Secretary-General.‖231 Furthermore, it promotes the protection of human rights and 
gender equity and women empowerment.
232
 The UNDP mission is to provide support to 
countries tin order to maintain human development. Under this framework, ―all the UNDP policy 
advice, technical support, advocacy, and contributions to strengthening coherence in global 
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development finance are aimed at improving the lives and livelihoods, and ―in the choices and 
opportunities open to them.‖233  
As stated in the ―Strategic Plan for UNDP 2008-2011, Accelerating Global Progress on Human 
Development‖, and as approved by the ―Member States of UNDP's Executive Board in 2007‖ on 
four major areas
234
:  
1) ―Democratic Governance‖ the UNDP provides the proper policy advice and technical 
support in order to support and enhance good governance and democracy, building 
capacities of institutions and individuals, and providing support to local authorities in 
terms of improving its capacities for better service delivery ―especially to women and the 
poor, as well as to ensure their voices are included in political decision-making.‖235 
Moreover, the UNDP ―supports existing democratic institutions by increasing dialogue, 
enhancing national debate, and facilitating consensus on national governance 
programs.‖236  
2)  ―Poverty Reduction and Support for the MDGs‖  where the UNDP assists countries in 
developing strategies to better combat and reduce poverty, through enhancing income 
generation and opportunities, ―linking poverty programs with each county‘s larger goals 
and policies, and ensuring a greater voice for the poor‖.237 The UNDP‘s work includes 
implementing ―pilot‖ development initiatives, promoting women‘s role in this field.238 
For instance, the ―UNDP International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)‖, has 
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succeeded in Brasilia, Brazil to expand ―the capacities of developing countries to design 
implement and evaluate socially inclusive development projects.‖239 
3) ―Environment and Sustainable Development ― aiming at addressing environmental issues 
in order to build the developing countries‘ abilities to endorse  a  sustainable human 
development strategies aiming at  reducing poverty.‖240 The UNDP‘ s aim is to enhance 
the countries‘ capacities in order to better ―address the global environmental issues by 
providing innovative policy advice and linking partners through environmentally 
sensitive development projects that help poor people build sustainable livelihoods.‖241 
The UNDP‘s strategy regarding the environment stresses on ―effective water governance 
including access to water supply and sanitation, access to sustainable energy services, 
sustainable land management to combat desertification and land degradation, 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and policies to control emissions of 
harmful pollutants and ozone-depleting substances.‖242   
4) ―Crisis Prevention and Recovery‖ the UNDP‘s aim is ―to reduce the risk of armed 
conflicts or disasters, and promotes early recovery after crises have occurred.‖243 The 
UNDP‘s country offices is present to provide the needed ―support to local government in 
needs assessment, capacity development‖, coordinated planning, and policy and standard 
setting. 
244
Examples of the UNDP risk reduction programs include efforts to control 
small arms proliferation, and programs to encourage peace-building and prevent 
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violence.
245
 Recovery programs include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
ex-combatants, demining efforts, programs to reintegrate displaced persons, restoration of 
basic services, and transitional justice systems for countries recovering from warfare.
246
 
The UNDP works within these areas and provides support to program countries by assisting 
them in monitoring, designing, planning and implementing strategies for ―poverty reduction, 
democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable 
development.‖247  
The UNDP furthermore encourages ―gender equality and women's empowerment‖, through 
implementing programs aiming at enhancing the capacities of the countries in developing 
strategies while reflecting national circumstances and national objectives to meet development 
goals.
248
 
Moreover, the UNDP acts as an advisory body and its work also include provision of training, 
and financial support to developing countries.
249
 Furthermore, the UNDP has maintained since 
1990 the publication of the annual “Human Development Report based on the Human 
Development Index”, ―to measure and analyze developmental progress. In addition to a global 
Report, the UNDP publishes regional, national, and local Human Development Reports.‖250 The 
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UNDP mobilized all ―global and national efforts to achieve the goals and national development 
priorities‖ set up by hosted countries. 251 
 
UNDP in Lebanon 
In 1982, the Lebanese government officially requested assistance from the UNDP to 
support the Lebanese authority in formulating and implementing development initiatives in the 
country. Accordingly, the two parties signed an agreement, known as ―the Standard Basic 
Assistance Agreement (SBAA)‖, which articulates the mandate and objectives of the UNDP 
mission in Lebanon, and the responsibility of the Lebanese government in this new partnership, 
in addition to setting the stage for the establishment of UNPD mission in the country.
252
  In this 
context, the  new accord authorizes a permanent presence of the UNDP mission in Lebanon 
under the guidance of  a Resident Representative, which was officially accredited to the country 
and whom main responsibilities to liaise all the activities and programs of the UNDP with the 
Lebanese Government.  The aim of this partnership is to assist and supplement ―the national 
efforts of Lebanon in solving problems relating to economic development, social progress, 
equity, and better standards of life.‖253 ―The SBA was the legal agreement between the Lebanese 
government and UNDP outlining the general conditions for UNDP cooperation under which all 
UNDP program activities are carried out.‖254 This treaty endorses the essential circumstances 
―under which UNDP and its Executing Agencies shall assist the Government in carrying out its 
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development projects, and under which such UNDP-assisted projects shall be executed.‖255 ―It 
applies to all UNDP assistance and to such project documents or other instruments as the parties 
may conclude to define the particulars of such assistance.‖256 ―It is an international treaty that 
prevails over national laws.‖257 As such and following the period of civil war, the UNDP was 
closely involved in the identification of national needs and priorities in the country in order to 
support the attainment of sustainable development goals.  
The Resident Representative of the UNDP Lebanon is considered the decision making authority 
in the country, and this authority ―delegates to various levels of management such as the Country 
Director and Deputy Resident Representative.‖258 Decisions in the office are undertaken ―by 
various bodies in the UNDP, including the management group which is responsible for setting 
the direction of the UNDP program priorities, and the Program and Operations Groups focusing 
on project management and financial and human resources.‖259 The UNDP in Lebanon has a 
close partnership with the ―Council of Reconstruction and Development (CDR)‖, a public body 
founded in early 1977 ―partially to replace the Ministry of Planning‖.260 The role of the CDR 
developed to overpass the mere responsibility to reconstruct and develop, to further include 
activities that tackles socio-economic matters, and ―has therefore become the de facto 
government counterpart of UNDP.‖261 Projects and programs are undertaken in close 
collaboration with the CDR, and in coordination with the relevant ministries and departments 
engaged in the initiatives. 
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In regards to the objectives and directions of the UNDP‘s work in Lebanon, it is important to 
note that the country office and the government are not the sole ―decision-makers in this 
regards‖; whereas donors play a key role in financing, providing technical support, as well as 
sustaining the development activities.
262
 Program revisions ―are held on a six-month basis that 
brings together the government, the UNDP, and the donors to discuss progress towards 
development results, also known as Tripartite Review meetings.‖263 Other participants such as 
NGOs and members of civil society, and stakeholders frequently participated in those 
meetings.
264
 
2006 in particular was a unique year, and witnessed the emergence of significant resources 
programs for ―the early recovery and post-conflict portfolio, thus becoming the largest UNDP 
program.‖265 This program delivered ―significant results in the areas of physical reconstruction 
and in recovery of livelihoods in 2007, many of its activities were completed in 2008.‖266 The 
―UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development‖, a 
guiding document at the corporate local level, was prepared and endorsed for UNDP in 2007.
267
 
Accordingly, the UNDP country office in Lebanon planned and developed its programs and 
results under the framework of this guideline, always in line with ―the national priorities and 
needs‖.268 
 
A backward perspective to UNDP presence in Lebanon 
                                                          
262
 Ibid 
263
 Ibid 
264
 Ibid 
265
 Ibid 
266
United Nations Development Program, “UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery in the Aftermath of July 
2006 War.” 
267
United Nations Development Program and the United Nations Population Fund, Lebanon, “UNDP Strategic Plan, 
2008-2011: Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development” (progress report, Beirut, Lebanon, 2008). 
268
“UNDP Lebanon”. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the UNDP has been present in Lebanon since the 1960s.
269
 In 
the face of the civil war‘s devastating toll on human lives, the country‘s infrastructure, 
institutions of state, and economic structure and fiscal framework, the 1989 Taef Agreement 
brought the civil war to an end, marked the beginning of a new era of political stability, and set 
in motion opportunities for Lebanon‘s reconstruction and economic and social recovery270, with 
the exception of the south that was under Israeli occupation until the year 2000.
271
 These 
promising conditions following the Taef Agreement also prompted the initiation of a modality of 
―strategic partnership between UNDP and government institutions‖, adapted to meet the 
challenges of Lebanon‘s emergence from the devastation of the civil war.272 In 1991, at the 
request of the Lebanese government, the UNDP established its first Policy Advisory Unit (PAU) 
co-located in the Ministry of Finance, to regenerate the foundations of public finance and fiscal 
reforms.
273
 The PAU provides advice on needed policy and legislative reforms, and contributes 
to their formulation. It also implements approved reform measures within the Ministry, 
strengthens systems and human resource capacities, and engages in the transfer of knowledge 
and best practices.
274
 This partnership modality was soon replicated in several other service 
ministries and key government offices to accompany national efforts towards a continuous 
transition from post-civil war reconstruction, reform and recovery to longer-term and sustained 
development.
275
 As previously mentioned, although the UNDP presence in Lebanon assisted the 
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country following the civil war period and focused on local needs; ―its activities can be also seen 
in the regional perspective‖, ―Program on Governance in the Arab Region‖ (POGAR).276  
POGAR is present since 2000 and is ―dedicated to the promotion and development of good 
governance practices in the Arab States.‖277 A ―Sub-Regional Resource Facility for Arab States 
(SURF-AS)‖, also complements this with a goal to assist UNDP country offices and ―maximize 
knowledge sharing across the region.‖278 
In parallel to its work with government institutions, the UNDP also established regional offices 
in three regions of the country: the first, in Mount Lebanon, to assist the displaced of the civil 
war to return to settle in their communities of origin and help create opportunities for them to 
resume their lives and livelihoods.
279
 The second UNDP regional office was established in the 
South, to assist in the socio-economic rehabilitation and development of the areas liberated in the 
year 2000 after 22 years of Israeli occupation. This assistance included capacity support to the 
National Demining Office and Mine Action, support to former detainees and the war disabled, 
regenerating economic and employment opportunities, as well as supporting the youth and 
women to participate directly in the revitalization and development of their communities.
280
 A 
third UNDP regional office was established in the late 1990‘s in the Northern region of Akkar. 
This was in line with the growing recognition that regional disparities in socio-economic 
indicators, particularly poverty indicators, were largely concentrated in the peripheral areas of 
the country and, most particularly in Akkar.
281
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The UNDP Programs in Lebanon, similar to the UNDP Programs worldwide, complements 
national efforts along four main axes of support: ―Good Governance‖, ―Pro-Poor and inclusive 
economic development‖, ―Energy and Environment‖, and ―Equitable Social development‖.282 
The UNDP‘s support is provided at the level of policy and legislative reforms (capacity building, 
formulation, implementation, and knowledge transfer) as well as on the ground, through projects 
formulated and implemented with local communities, civil society organizations, national NGOs 
and municipalities.
283
 By the mid-1990‘s, the UNDP‘s approach focused on ―sustained human 
development‖ as the primary objective and measure of overall national development.284 This was 
reinforced in 2000 by the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals and their subsequent 
translation into relevant national development targets; prime among those was the reduction of 
poverty and regional disparities.
285
 
As such, the UNDP‘s direct presence on the ground and partnerships at policy levels enabled it 
to respond to the crisis immediately upon the war‘s outbreak in July 2006, it also enabled it to 
respond to the urgent needs for early recovery in the war‘s immediate aftermath. 286Throughout, 
the UNDP simultaneously engaged in efforts to ensure a smooth transition towards sustained 
recovery and longer-term development, inclusive of associated policy and legislative reforms 
corresponding to the thematic pillars on which the UNDP focuses its assistance.
287
 
The May-June 2005 parliamentary elections had delivered a government committed to reforms 
which were spelled out broadly in the new Government‘s ―Policy Platform‖ (bayan el wizari) 
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that obtained parliament‘s vote of confidence.288 It subsequently set out to define the measures 
needed to achieve electoral, financial, socio-economic and other sector reforms.
289
 Among the 
results of these efforts was the expansion of a medium-term package of fiscal and economic 
reforms, accompanied by a Social Action Plan, which the Government presented to a donors 
conference to held in Beirut in 2006.
290
 
Beginning 2006, the government had been in the process of finalizing the medium-term package 
of fiscal and economic reforms aimed at reducing Lebanon‘s untenably high sovereign debt to 
sustainable levels, and at placing the economy on a sustainable growth path
291
. For the first time 
ever, this package of reforms included a ―Social Action Plan‖ to provide the poor and vulnerable 
strata of the population with improved coverage, quality, and efficiency of social protection and 
safety net schemes.
292
 An important contribution by the UNDP in this connection was the 
inclusion in the Social Action Plan of a commitment to elaborate a comprehensive Social 
Development Strategy which would extend beyond social safety nets to encompass a multi-
sector approach to reducing regional disparities in socio-economic indicators, particularly 
poverty indicators, and promoting balanced, inclusive and equitable development, framed by the 
relevant national targets of the MDGs.
293
 The formulation of this Social Development Strategy 
envisaged broad participation by civil society and local communities, investments and 
employment creation in the production sectors of the economy, and better integration of the 
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historically poor peripheral regions into the national economy, as well as strengthening 
decentralization efforts.
294
 
The Government had also initiated a process of engaging the public in a debate of the proposed 
reform measures, in an effort to refine the measures and to build broad national consensus and 
support for their implementation before presenting the reform program to a donors‘ conference 
to be held in Beirut by the end of 2006.
295
 The UNDP helped facilitate one such debate between 
the government and civil society organizations in April 2006.
296
 Economic trends revealed ―a 
projected 6% growth rate by the end of that same year‖, helping to recuperate ―from a zero 
growth rate‖ in the previous year; the country was preparing for a booming summer tourism 
season.
297
  The preliminary results from the 2004 the UNDP-supported multi-purpose household 
survey has preliminary indications of Lebanon registering a ―9% decline in relative poverty since 
1996 (from 28% to 19%) and a 2% decline in extreme poverty (from 7% to 5%).‖298  These 
figures were due mainly to the improved ―social dimensions of poverty‖ and showed an ever 
present great ―need to improve the economic dimensions of poverty‖, specifically incomes and 
employment‖, when war broke out on July 12, 2006.299 
Outbreak of July war and UNDP’s intervention in Lebanon 
As Israel launched a full-scale war on Lebanon, including a military blockade by air, land 
and sea which lasted weeks beyond the formal end of the war, the government rallied its effort in 
response to the humanitarian crisis. The Lebanese government immediately responded with a 
                                                          
294
 Ibid 
295
“Setting the Stage for Long Term Reconstruction: The National Early Recovery Process, Stockholm Conference 
for Lebanon’s Early Recovery,” retrieved on October 10, 2010, 
http://www.lebanonundersiege.gov.lb/Documents/StockholmConferenceDocument.pdf. 
296
United Nations Development Program, “UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery.” 
297
 Ibid 
298
 Ibid 
299
 Ibid 
 
 
number of measures, including the provision of relief supplies from existing government stocks, 
organizing the humanitarian effort and engaging the international community to provide 
support.
300
 UNDP was able to respond immediately to the humanitarian crisis.  
On Day two of the war, as Lebanon was being subjected to massive bombardments of its civilian 
infrastructure, causing large-scale population displacements, the government requested of the 
UNDP to add the capacity of the High Relief Committee (HRC) in its efforts to organize and 
coordinate the overall humanitarian response.
301
 UNDP quickly co-located three of its ―Mine 
Action‖ staff with the HRC and they helped it to devise a humanitarian operations information 
system to update and consolidate the basic data needed to meet the evolving humanitarian needs 
on a daily basis.
302
 Such basic data were supplied to the HRC by the relevant services ministries, 
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), municipalities, and the Lebanese Red 
Cross. Data included, for example, origin and destination of population movements and 
displacements, numbers of displaced, the locations where they found refuge and shelter schools, 
community centers, host families, type and amount of emergency relief supplies required, 
number and location of civilian casualties, damage and destruction of transport and other civilian 
infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, power supply, etc.), and numbers and locations of people who were 
cut off and had become inaccessible as a result of destruction of the road network.
303
 
The UNDP also provided a liaison to act, when needed, as a conduit between the HRC and the 
UN humanitarian agencies, including the preparation of the ―UN Flash Appeal‖.304 
                                                          
300
“Setting the Stage for Long Term Reconstruction.” 
301
Republic of Lebanon, “Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform “International Conference for Support to Lebanon” 
(paper presented by the Lebanese Government, Paris, France, 2007). 
302
United Nations Development Program, “ UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery.” 
303
“Lebanon Crisis Flash Appeal,” retrieved October 10, 2010, 
http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h_Index/Flash_2006_LebanonCrisis/$FILE/Flash_ 
2006_LebanonCrisis.doc?OpenElement. 
304
Ibid 
 
 
Because of the logistics challenge arising from the bombardments of Lebanon‘s transport 
infrastructure and the military blockade Israel had imposed, the UNDP facilitated the 
establishment of a functional presence  by World Food Program (WFP) in Lebanon to facilitate 
the transport of relief supplies to populations in need ―within Lebanon and safe passage of relief 
supplies into Lebanon.‖305 The participating UN agencies were organized into ―Clusters‖ as 
follows: health (led by WHO, with ―support from UNICEF and UNFPA); food/nutrition (led by 
WFP), water and sanitation (led by UNICEF), logistics (led by WFP), shelter (led by United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR), protection/mine action (led by UNMACC, 
in cooperation with UNDP).‖ 306 
Following the Lebanese Cabinet‘s endorsement of the ―UN Flash Appeal‖ and logistics plan, 
then Prime Minister Siniora urged that the UN humanitarian operation not extend beyond the 
planned 90 days.
307
 
The UNDP immediately committed funding from its own resources, purchased needed relief 
items from the local markets (cooking utensils, hygiene kits, mattresses, and blankets) and 
arranged for their transport and direct distribution to the displaced families who had headed to 
Mount Lebanon and Beirut and were sheltered in schools or public spaces.
308
 With the arrival to 
Mount Lebanon of internally displaced families from the South and from the Beirut Southern 
Suburbs, the UNDP‘s regional office in Aley was set to be directly involved in organizing the 
procurement, transport, delivery and distribution of these relief supplies, in partnership with civil 
society organizations.
309
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The UN humanitarian effort represented a comparatively of a small scale as regarding the overall 
humanitarian respond, the bulk of which was Lebanese and from the Arab region. The UNDP‘s 
contributions, all of which were funded from its own resources and none from the UN Flash 
Appeal, were relatively modest, but timely and anchored in its long-standing partnerships with 
government and with the broad spectrum of civil society organizations, local communities and 
municipalities, which actually took the lead on the ground, with strong support from the 
Lebanese Red Cross. ―The UN‘s Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), an agency for 
coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN 
humanitarian partners‖, which is normally effective in other humanitarian contexts, proved 
limited in Lebanon with the existing principal actors.
310
 The IASC assumes a formulaic reliance 
on UN (rather than national) leadership of the humanitarian response, in collaboration with 
international NGOs (more than with national NGOs and CSOs) and ―traditional‖ OECD donor 
partners.
311
 In the context of Lebanon, however, the ―traditional‖ donors are the Arab Gulf 
States,  the Government is highly capable albeit constrained by the imposed military blockade; 
and Lebanese civil society organizations and NGOs are vibrant, numerous and appeared to be 
effective.
312
 
While the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon garnered strong national, regional, and international 
support to meet the emergency relief needs of the people who were displaced or under siege.  
The other important dimensions of humanitarian action and imperatives as governed by 
―international humanitarian and human rights law‖ - particularly, the protection of civilians, 
humanitarian access (e.g. for rescuing the wounded), and proportionality in the conduct of war, 
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were severely compromised and, in several instances, were violated. The destruction also made 
risky, not only to deliver and distribute relief supplies, but to rescue and evacuate civilian 
casualties, or enable civilians to move safely to relatively more secure areas.
313
 
The demonstration at the UN House on July 30, 2006 protesting the massacre of civilians in 
Qana earlier that same day (the second Qana massacre in a decade), was a disturbing signal of an 
erosion in the credibility and perception of the UN ―as the embodiment of moral authority and 
international legitimacy, having relinquished its primary responsibility for preserving and 
promoting international peace and security.‖314 
Nevertheless and in collaboration with Policy Advisory Units in the relevant service ministries 
and in the Office of the Prime Minister, the UNDP launched Early Recovery planning. The result 
was a set of five ―Quick Starting and High Impact Early Recovery‖ initiatives to be launched 
simultaneously at the end of the war and ―to be initiated from UNDP‘s own resources until such 
a time when additional resources could be mobilized from the international donor 
community.‖315 
This Early Recovery package, approved by the Prime Minister prior to the Stockholm donor 
conference on August 2, 2006, consisted of the following projects: assisted the municipalities in 
rubble and debris removal; cleaning-up the oil spill in the Lebanese water, restoring fishermen‘s 
livelihoods, reactivation of Public Administration services, and support for National 
Coordination of Recovery Efforts.
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Furthermore, at the sub-national coordination level, the UNDP supported the UN Resident 
Coordinator (UNRC) in the planning for, and establishment of four UNRC regional offices, one 
in each of the four different regions of the country (South, North, Bekaa and Beirut Southern 
Suburbs ), to facilitate and coordinate the  recovery efforts on the ground.
317
 The UNDP also set 
in motion plans for undertaking the post-war assessments with the relevant government 
counterparts, looking ahead to a continuous transition between Early and Sustained Recovery as 
well as equity and balance across the regions and population groups most affected, directly 
and/or indirectly, by the war. 
At the local level, the UNDP supported the war-affected municipalities‘ efforts to undertake 
participatory community-based damage and needs assessments, on the basis of which they 
elaborated prioritized recovery plans, thus strengthening local planning and resource 
mobilization capacities as well.
318
 
As indicated above, the UNDP has had a presence on the ground with the people since the early 
1990‘s in Aley (Mount Lebanon), Tyre (South Lebanon) and Akkar (North Lebanon), which 
enabled it to participate directly and immediately in the provision of relief supplies. Following 
the July War, the UNDP established three additional regional offices in Chtaurah for the Bekaa 
area, in the municipality of Haret Hreik for Beirut Southern suburbs, and in Tripoli (in addition 
to Akkar) for the North. 
319
 
With the establishment of UN Resident Coordinator Recovery ―hubs‖ at sub-national levels, 
funded by European Commission for Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO),  Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA), and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), the UNDP regional offices also support the overall coordination and coherence of 
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recovery efforts, providing a platform shared by national and international NGOs, civil society 
organizations, municipal authorities and decentralized ministries as well as donors.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE UNDP AND THE RECOVERY CHALLENGES IN BEIRUT SOUTHERN 
SUBURBS 
 
Challenges in Beirut Southern Suburbs: 
  The Beirut Southern Suburbs is a heavily populated area that suffered from poverty, 
youth unemployment, and lack of services, conditions that were aggravated by the July 2006 
war.  
In preparation for the recovery program in the area, the UNDP conducted a detailed assessment 
with municipalities and local NGOs in Beirut Southern Suburbs to better identify the 
characteristics and the challenges of the program target areas. The findings were as follows: 
Unemployment was and still is a major challenge identified throughout the assessment 
undertaken by the UNDP-Beirut Southern Suburbs office following the July 2006 war. While 
unemployment was widespread before the war like in other places in the country, the destruction 
of businesses and light industries in the area compounded the situation into catastrophic 
dimensions. Around 2,500 families have lost jobs in BSS, further aggravating poverty, and 
creating a region that has become even more vulnerable and susceptible to havoc.
321
  Families 
became homeless, and jobless in an uncertain political atmosphere. There was a need for 
immediate assistance to the affected communities in all areas of life, but mainly with livelihoods 
and the fight against poverty.  The majority of enterprises in the area fall into the micro and 
small categories.
322
  Those could be supported and encouraged to initiate programs that facilitate 
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access to micro-credit in order recapitalize destroyed or damaged equipment and tools and to 
support skills training.  
Another challenge that seemed very significant for an inclusive recovery process was engaging 
partners from civil society. The aim was to strengthen the participation of civil society 
organizations to ensure effectiveness of their response in the recovery process.  
Moreover, the pace of International NGO support to the Beirut Southern Suburbs following the 
cessation of war was very slow. It has been observed that few International NGOs are in the area 
to support the community to recover from its trauma. 
323
This may be attributed to the fact that the 
area of intervention was new to the different players and donors (as compared to the South of 
Lebanon, where the UNDP, UN agencies and bodies, local and international organizations have 
been present and active since 2000) and were more familiar with the context. As for Beirut 
Southern Suburbs, no previous or similar experience to the South had ever been exerted, donors 
and players were more hesitant to step in, but hesitancy seemed to relinquish following the 
UNDP‘s intervention in the area.    
Third identifiable challenge identified was the major gap in coordination issues among the 
various NGOs working in Beirut Southern Suburbs. Some argued that NGOs even lacked 
primary knowledge of who is doing what in the area. 
324
Thus, a mechanism was needed to ensure 
proper coordination, dissemination, and exchange of information among the various CSOs to 
properly support the needs and to provide a setting that promotes complementary and effective 
interventions.   
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UNDP’s intervention in Beirut Southern Suburbs post July 2006 war 
Various internal and external actors took on a significant role in the recovery, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts in Lebanon. They included international organizations, 
International NGOs and bilateral support from various government agencies and multilateral 
agencies. However, in the larger context, the Beirut Southern Suburbs was marginalized and 
lacked targeted funding.
325
 The UNDP has played an active lead role in the recovery and 
development of the area. A relationship was established with the municipalities and other 
stakeholders ensuring their inclusive participation in the recovery and early rehabilitation process 
of the region. This was done through providing support on both the institutional and local levels. 
As mentioned earlier, a UNRC regional office in Beirut Southern suburbs was established to 
coordinate and maintain the coherence of all recovery efforts, and launched as such, a plan for 
the recovery activities.
326
 
The resulting rubble of the massive destruction the war caused impeded the return to normalcy, 
and demanded urgent attention by development actors. Four days after the cessation of hostilities 
endorsement, the UNDP immediately responded to the humanitarian crisis in Beirut Southern 
Suburbs and developed an emergency program to address the emerging needs of the community. 
The UNDP with its partners provided support to municipalities in removing rubble from the 
streets in the area. Strong liaisons were maintained with the municipalities and the major 
stakeholders in the four most affected areas in Beirut Southern Suburbs, namely the Haret Hreik, 
Chiah, Borj El Barajneh and Ghobeiry areas. With the contribution of the Bureau of Crisis 
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Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), the UNDP was able to launch its rubble removal and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure activities as a primary emergency intervention identified and 
prioritized by the communities. 
327
Through this contribution, BCPR enabled the UNDP to be 
present in Beirut Southern Suburbs for the first time during its Program cycle in Lebanon and 
ensured a strategy compatible with the area and its urgent needs.   
Thus, the UNDP established its field presence within the affected community and set up an office 
in the municipality of Haret Hreik and later in the municipality of Chiah.
328
 The UNDP‘s team in 
Beirut Southern Suburbs conducted damage and needs assessment through data collection, 
information analysis, site visits, and in-depth meetings with local municipalities and the Social 
Development Centers affiliated to the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), as well as grassroots 
associations, NGOs and other stakeholders.
329
 The UNDP followed up the evolving situation in 
Beirut Southern Suburbs in terms of the direct and indirect impact of conflict on livelihoods and 
economic recovery, especially at the grassroots level. The needs assessment was periodically 
updated to identify and adequately respond to the changing needs and context. 
330
 
The UND Program initiated the execution of many early recovery projects and at a further stage, 
recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods projects with a budget of $ 2.4 Million USD 
funded by different donors such as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the 
European Commission‘s Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO), Austria and Australia.331 
The early recovery projects included: the removal of debris as well as ―rehabilitation of 
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infrastructure:  electricity poles, sewage systems, rehabilitation of public premises, and provision 
of machines and equipment to assist the municipalities in performing the necessary restoration and 
maintenance work.‖332 The recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods projects included 
support to the war affected communities in terms of provision of new equipment, support to youth 
through vocational training programs, support to the war disabled community, and special support 
to unemployed women and others affected by the war. 
Around $ 900,000 USD were allocated by the European Commission‘s Humanitarian Aid 
Department (ECHO) to emergency response and to the rehabilitation phase in Beirut Southern 
suburbs, which encompassed infrastructure rehabilitation, and to restore the livelihood of the most 
vulnerable members of the population.
333
 The SIDA grants reached around $1.9 Million USD for 
two different stages: the early recovery, and restoration of lives and livelihoods. The projects 
included in addition to rubble removal and infrastructure works the establishment of a vocational 
training center, installation of solar energy systems, and provision of support to the war affected 
fishermen, youths, and women.
334
 
Australia was also among the early donors and contributed to the recovery phase with an amount 
of $165,000 USD allocated for the rehabilitation of Haret Hreik streets, and restoration of 
sewage systems, pipe services, sidewalks restoration, as well as procurement of equipment 
(including computers, scanners, photocopiers and office materials) to the Haret Hreik 
municipality. 
335
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Under the overall objective of Restoration of Lives and Social Assistance in Lebanon, the 
Austrian government also allocated around $317,000 USD to Beirut Southern Suburbs for 
assisting the war affected communities there.
336
 
Early Recovery phase 
As previously mentioned, the UNDP first initiated the rubble removal and restoration of 
municipal services and utilities. This quick starting-high impact early recovery project 
concentrated on restoring the capacity of cash-strapped local municipalities to provide a number 
of critical services immediately following the war. The UNDP initially provided from its own 
resources $200,000 USD in cash grants to the four most war-affected municipalities in the 
Southern Suburbs of Beirut namely Haret Hreik, Borj Al Barajneh, Chiah and Ghobeiry, 
allocating to each in proportion to the extent of war damage and destruction in their 
communities. 
337
 
A few days following the cessation of hostilities, a meeting was held with the mayors of these 
municipalities, after which early recovery plans were developed and prioritized, and work began 
immediately on clearing the tons of rubble and debris from side streets with the needed 
machinery and equipment, complementing the larger efforts on the main roads undertaken by the 
Ministry of Public Works and Transport.
338
 
Alongside rubble removal, other small-scale activities included repair of neighborhood side 
streets and public buildings, restoration of basic utilities and services like the repair of street 
lights and clean-up of sections of the sewage systems and storm water conduits.  
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The rubble removal activities were conducted with small grants provided to municipalities aimed 
at procuring heavy machinery to open the blocked roads and remove the rubble at lower costs. 
This initiative enabled the municipalities to cut the cost for renting rubble removal machineries 
and employ local labor for the public works. With generous contributions from other donors such 
as, ECHO, Austria and Australia, the UNDP was able to quickly expand its coverage to activities 
in the four municipalities in the Beirut Southern Suburbs. The UNDP supported the restoration 
of municipal lighting, the rehabilitation of roads, irrigation canals, storm water conduits and 
market stalls, and the procurement of electric generators and machinery to strengthen the ability 
of the municipalities to increase their responsiveness to local recovery needs.
339
 
The donors largely contributed to the ongoing recovery initiatives as an effort to overcome the 
war consequences, with SIDA allocating an amount totaling $344,000 USD for rubble removal 
and rehabilitation of infrastructure,
340
 ECHO allocating around $548,000 USD for rubble 
removal, road repairs, restoration of street lamps and public buildings,
341
 and Australia allocating 
$165,000 USD for the rehabilitation of two major streets in the area.
342
 
The grants from SIDA, ECHO and Australia for rubble removal and infrastructure rehabilitation 
aimed at supporting the municipalities in Beirut Southern Suburbs in the process of rubble 
removal, in order to facilitate reconstruction works and to process demolition waste, thus 
creating opportunities for the recovery and re-use of processed materials and safe return of the 
locals to their houses. This initiative, in addition to clearing the areas from rubble in an 
environmentally sound manner, also provided local employment opportunities.
343
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The works were undertaken following an assessment of the amounts of rubble for clearance, and 
accordingly three contracts were signed for rubble removal in the areas of Haret Hreik, Borj 
Barajneh and Chiah in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut.
344
 The selection of the locations and the 
contract amounts were determined based on the amount of rubble to be removed. Haret Hreik 
topped the list of municipalities in the amount of rubble removal it required. At that time, the 
assessment revealed that up to ―105,000 m3 of rubble needed to be removed‖ from Haret Hreik. 
Chiah came in second with ―3,200 m3 of rubble to be removed‖ and Borj al Barajneh third with 
―22,000 m3 of rubble to be removed.‖345 This phase was crucial for the next stage aiming at the 
restoration of basic ―services such as rebuilding roads, restoring power and the rebuilding and 
rehabilitation of some housing.‖346 
The early recovery interventions funded by  ECHO included basic community infrastructure 
repairs to Haret Hreik, Chiah, Borj el Barajneh and Ghobeiry  such as rubble removal, 
rehabilitation of infrastructure roads repair, clean-up and repair of sewage systems, sidewalks 
restorations, repair of municipal building, and procurement of machinery.
347
 This initiative was 
developed further to include providing municipalities with grants for the procurement of 
machinery thus facilitating debris removal at decreased costs, and having the sustainable benefit of 
having this heavy machinery to use later in the capacity building stages of the municipalities in 
Beirut Southern Suburbs.
348
   
As for SIDA, the contribution falls under the title of ―Recovery Assistance to the Basic 
Community Infrastructure and Services in Beirut Southern Suburbs‖ and ―Emergency 
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Restoration of Lives and Livelihoods‖.349 The first phase of projects included rehabilitating of the 
infrastructure of Borj El Barajneh which encompassed the following activities: sidewalks 
restorations, drinking water restorations, sewage repairs, lighting repairs, asphalt for roads, and 
municipal clinic rehabilitation.
350
 Solar Water Heaters were provided in Beirut Southern Suburbs 
to local community facilities such as public clinics and schools.  This activity directly decreased 
household costs on electricity, while simultaneously decreasing electricity demand on the 
Government which already suffered from a low supply capacity.  It also ultimately saved carbon 
dioxide emissions; a major environmental concern. Interventions included the installation of 
solar heating systems in 10 locations in the Borj el Barjaneh area, and solar lighting in Ghobeiry 
municipality and some streets in that area. 
351
 
As for Australia, the amount allocated was for the rehabilitation of two streets in the Haret Hreik 
area.
352
 
Recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods 
At later stages, the UNDP‘s interventions shifted from early recovery activities to recovery 
and restoration of lives and livelihoods. The former entailed specific infrastructure rehabilitation, 
clearance of rubble and debris (an amount of 130,240 m
3
 of rubble removed), road repairs (about 
12 roads were repaired), repair of public buildings (three municipalities), restoration of street 
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lamp/poles in seven streets, repair of sewage systems and storm water conduits in ten streets, 
procurement of tools and 20 pieces of machinery for municipal service delivery.
353
  
As for the recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods phase, the UNDP initiated set of 
projects (with a budget of around $1.5 million USD) and funded by SIDA, ECHO, and Austria to 
respond to urgent needs of the war affected communities.
354
 With the presence of the UNDP sub-
regional offices in Beirut Southern Suburbs, the UNDP assessed the most pressing needs of the 
communities through surveying the damages accrued to the infrastructure of the villages, and the 
effect on the residents‘ socio economic circumstances.  The assessment was used to help local 
municipalities in prioritizing the interventions needed with and in preparing their respective 
recovery plans accordingly. 
The UNDP then initiated and implemented the recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods 
project to meet the needs and urgent requirements of the socio-economic situation in war 
affected communities.
355
 Initiatives entailed support programs at both the local and institutional 
level. Interventions varied from vocational training to unemployed youths, support to Small and 
Medium Enterprises to restoration of economic activities of fishermen, in addition to other 
infrastructure restoration for better service delivery in the community and improved socio-
economic activities.
356
 The main objective of this initiative was aimed at restoring the 
livelihoods, income and employability status of the affected population during the war.  The 
project supported the economy development and in return assisted in reducing the poverty factor. 
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At an early stage, the oil spill from Israel‘s naval blockade and bombing of the Ouzai port were 
devastating to the fisheries sector. An estimated 600 fishermen and their families lost their only 
source of income as a result.
357
 The UNDP allocated $200,000 USD from its own resources and 
with support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for the Fishermen‘s 
Associations in Lebanon to repair damaged boats, provide fishing nets and engines, and rebuild 
the fish market in the Ouzai Port.
358
 The UNDP initially focused on fishermen because they were 
among the poorest occupational groups whose livelihoods were devastated by both the oil spill 
and direct destruction of their main economic assets, it extended its focus afterwards to other 
occupational categories under the overall objective of restoring lives and livelihoods, which the 
UNDP considers as the measure of sustained recovery.  
The following activities are illustrative of the UNDP‘s initiatives for preserving livelihoods, with 
funding support from ECHO, Austria, and SIDA. 
The ECHO funded interventions at this stage with a budget of around $348,000 USD and which 
included the restoration of the popular markets in Mouawad Street in the Chiah area.
359
  The 
project included repairs to the markets for the purpose of restoring the economic livelihood, 
targeting 300 Medium and Small Enterprises. It included Interlock pavements and widening of 
sidewalks, planting sidewalks with trees, placing benches on sidewalks, providing garbage bins on 
sidewalks, installing a sign with the street name, installing a sign with all shop names, and building 
speed bumps.
360
 Another alternative market for fruits and vegetable was reconstructed in the Hey 
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El Soulloum area aiming at restoring livelihoods in the area.
361
 The project rehabilitated the 
alternative fruit and vegetable market in Hey El Soulloum to allow 110 vegetable and fruit sellers 
to relocate from the crowded streets to a place where they could exhibit and sell their locally 
produced goods.
362
 The market is environmentally and health friendly first and foremost, secondly 
the market provides sellers with the opportunity to display their products at a lower rent rate giving 
the chance to a wider range of poor residents to sell their goods. Thirdly, the market is a more 
organized, safe, and secure place for sellers to promote their local products, and for visitors 
(especially women) where accidents of harassment and stealing could be avoided. The market 
provided direct support for those who lost their jobs after the war, and were unemployed and it 
stimulated economic recovery.
363
 Lastly, ECHO funded the training of around 120 unemployed 
persons in Beirut Southern Suburbs, through the provision of vocational training courses to 
increase employability through capacity building in specific fields (such as car mechanics; beauty 
training; and heating/cooling systems and aluminum) especially for those who lost their jobs after 
the July war.  This in addition to the provision of tool kits at the end of the training that were 
meant to support the beneficiaries in starting-up their own small enterprises even if they could not 
get employed.
364
 The project was implemented through three non-governmental organizations, 
namely Amel Association, Imam Sadr Foundation, and YMCA.
365
 Overall, it improved the socio-
economic conditions in some areas in Beirut Southern Suburbs by creating productive employment 
opportunities, skills development, and empowerment for the affected communities where both the 
UNDP and ECHO aimed at raising the standards and the living conditions of the population. 
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As for SIDA, interventions in this phase fell under ―Emergency Restoration of Lives and 
Livelihoods‖ with a budget of around $ 685,000 USD that was allocated for the establishment and 
equipping of a vocational training center and permanent market for women‘s home made products 
in Haret Hreik.  This was done with the purpose of assisting the vulnerable and affected 
community to acquire knowledge of occupational skills, and to provide more employment 
opportunities.
366
  
Under the overall objective of this phase, it was essential to provide support to fishermen of the 
Ouzai and Jnah ports that were affected by the July war. Interventions included the provision of 
radars to 150 fishermen for better underwater fish location, and a later stage, the provision of 
equipment at a such as cooling rooms and an Ice fridge to support income generation at the 
port.
367
 Another intervention implemented in partnership with the Kuwaiti Fund was the re-
channeling of the old affected sewage system in Ouzai in order for it to be discharged outside the 
port in an adequate source to avoid damage to the fishing industry.
368
 The previous condition of 
the sewage networks severely affected on the socio-economic conditions of the fishermen and 
their families. The sewage networks of the Ouzai area used to discharge at the port, polluting the 
fishing waters, which in return affected the health of the fishermen and ―the quantity and quality‖ 
of fishing.
369
 The UNDP intervention restored the sewage system and therefore restored the lives 
and livelihoods of the fisherman and the population of the surrounding area. The rehabilitation of 
the main entrance at the Ouzai Port damaged by the July war was also crucial before concluding 
the support given to fishermen in the area.
370
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Hey El Soulloum is the poorest and the most disadvantaged area in Beirut Southern Suburbs. 
With a total area of 2.7 km², the population is estimated at 120,000. 
371
Hey El Soulloum 
administratively falls under the Municipality of Choueifat.
372
  The extreme majority of 
inhabitants in Hey El Soulloum do not however originate from Choueifat, and residents are not 
represented in the Choueifat municipal council. Only 300 out of 120,000 people have the right to 
vote during the municipal elections of Choueifat. 
373
The area was plagued by unorganized 
construction, lack of basic public services (including social, educational and health) and 
pollution and inadequate living conditions were translated in shortages in electricity and water 
provisions. Although it wasn‘t highly affected or damaged by the war, the UNDP initiated some 
interventions for the sake of supporting the livelihoods of this, the poorest area in Beirut 
Southern suburbs.
374
 The implementation of initiatives was targeted mainly at the unemployed 
women and youths.
375
 The support was in the form of procuring equipment and machineries for 
women to start-up their own business at home, and the building of a Football playground aiming 
at enhancing peace-building and preventing crises.
376
 
The Austrian projects in the second phase worked with a budget of $317,000 USD under the title 
of ―Restoration of Livelihoods and Social Assistance in Lebanon‖.377 The projects included 
provision of direct support to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Haret Hreik through the 
procurement of tools and equipment for 128 SMEs that were affected or destroyed during the July 
war.
378
 Another intervention was the provision of physiotherapy Equipment to two Primary Health 
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Care centers in Borj El Barajneh and Ghobeiry municipalities, designated principally to serve the 
war disabled.
379
 Under the framework of this objective, another intervention was undertaken 
through the provision of maintenance of aid devices for 54 war disabled persons in Beirut Southern 
Suburbs.
380
 
As described earlier, the UNDP‘s interventions varied from early recovery activities to recovery 
of lives and livelihoods, and seemed to succeeded in supporting the local affected community, it 
also prepared the ground for a longer term development initiative in the area, aimed at working 
further on developing the capacities of the concerned entities to better plan interventions and 
programs. The interventions showed interest in implementing immediate action for the support 
of the income generation and social integration aspects.  The first post war rehabilitation 
program focused on providing the needed services, whereas the second one focused more on 
extending the needed services while keeping in mind the institutional building perspective to 
complement the efforts made by all previous interventions. The implemented program will then 
remain the backbone structure of a larger comprehensive intervention in the area while always 
considering and understanding ―the complexity and sensitivity of both the target area and the 
target population.‖381 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Lebanese state was faced with some daunting tasks in the post July 2006 war era.  
The country had suffered substantial devastation by Israel‘s heavy bombing, compounded by 
external actors‘ political and economic intrusions, and a politically divided interior.  Heavy fiscal 
and budgetary issues also needed to be addressed in order to stimulate a weak and imbalanced 
economy.  
Lebanon witnessed the rise of a series of conflicts; ranging from internal sectarian 
conflicts, to foreign occupations, insurgencies, the rise of transnational armed groups, and the 
use of Lebanon as a regional incubator for regional conflicts that often play out on its territories 
by proxy.  It is the observed weakness of the Lebanese state that lay at the root of the country‘s 
woes, although the role of outside actors cannot be minimized.   Following the July war, the 
Lebanese government was again faced with its inability to exercise its fundamental state 
sovereignty; it also found itself unable to assume exclusive or even primary responsibility for 
post war-reconstruction and recovery. It was viewed by many that the efforts of international 
donor agencies to alleviate and rebuild Lebanon following the latest war, needed to stress on 
enhancing the capabilities of the Lebanese authority. 
The recovery and rehabilitation process was not an easy one, and had to be dependent on 
the benevolence of regional and international donors. Although, the post July 2006 war recovery 
seemed a more difficult task than previous recovery efforts (comparing with the post-civil war 
era in 1990 for example), what remained constant is the historically demonstrated remarkable 
resilience of the Lebanese people. The government today is much weaker and subject to 
 
 
considerable sectarian divisions; and the situation has created greater dependence on the 
benevolence of international donors. To complicate the government problems, there has been 
significant ―capital flight‖, as well as   migration of skilled labor despite the end of the war. 
Since 1990, Lebanon has not been able to generate enough jobs for its young population 
resulting in skilled people exiting the country; the July 2006 war and the ensuing political 
instability has not rendered the situation any better. Nevertheless, Lebanon retains significant 
regional and International importance that hinges on the following factors:  first the successful 
reconstruction of the country‘s war damaged and long neglected infrastructure. Second, tackling 
the unsustainable fiscal shortages and debt extensions, as well as reinvigorating the private sector 
and enhancing the recovery of small and medium sized enterprises. Third, it is pivotal to tap on 
the strength Lebanon‘s banking sector to foster development, as well as strengthening the 
institutions of the government. There are however clear limits to what the country can do without 
outside help. Lebanon‘s future seems to depend heavily on the support of international lenders 
and donors. In this view ―the outcomes of the Paris III conference will be pivotal.‖382  
As a result of the summer attack the reconstruction efforts were focused on areas with a clear 
Shiite majority, in Beirut‘s southern suburbs and in rural areas of the country‘s South and Bekaa 
region. These areas are under the sway of Hezbollah and to a lesser extent the Amal movement. 
Further complicating the reconstruction and recovery processes in the post July 2006 era is the 
heightened politicization of the Lebanese political system, where the country is divided between 
Hezbollah and its supporters (The March 8 Camp) and what is usually referred to as the loyalist 
camp (The Mach 14 Coalition).  While state institutions today are in a better shape than during 
the civil war era, the state still faces major difficulties due to inefficiency in the work of 
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government, lingering nepotism, and a troubled relationship with Hezbollah and its allies who 
seemed to hold veto power over all government decisions. It was clear that opposing actors were 
trying to gain control over the reconstruction and recovery processed during the post summer 
war era.  This latest phase of reconstruction was characterized by being an overt struggle over 
resources and power, and a competition for influence over the weakened institutions of the 
Lebanese state, even more so than what was happening in the 1990s.  A further feature of the 
post July 2006 milieu is the heightened role of regional and International donors in the 
reconstruction and recovery processes, as well as in providing livelihood support for vulnerable 
groups. 
After the July war ended, polarization in the Lebanese interior became more apparent, and joint 
reconstruction and victim compensation agreements fell apart as a result. The country became 
divided between two opposing camps:  the first being ―March 14 Coalition, led by Saad Hariri, 
the son of the assassinated prime minister Saad Hariri, a coalition‖ that constituted the 
government majority and whose agenda leaned towards conserving the status quo in the balance 
of power in the country.  The second camp or as it was called ―the opposition‖ was led by 
Hezbollah, and in December 2006, the members of this camp, in a form of dissent, pulled out of 
government institutions and began ―extra-parliamentary‖ protests in central Beirut, the seat of 
most governmental buildings.  
But it was over reconstructing the rubble of Beirut's southern suburbs that political wrangling 
had been most intense, whereby Hezbollah's construction firm Jihad al Binaa claimed it was 
hampered in its efforts to begin rebuilding Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS) because of a lack of 
cooperation from the government. Hezbollah reinvigorated ―by its self-proclaimed victory over 
Israel, had announced taking responsibility for fixing the July 2006 War damages and had in turn 
 
 
been accused by the government of monopolizing reconstruction efforts instead of collaborating 
with central state institutions.‖383 
International donors may, rather unintentionally, play a major political role in the internal 
Lebanese conflict through the pretext of reconstruction interventions.. In Lebanon Western 
players like France and the United States, in addition to several Sunni Arab states supported  
loyalist camp that maintained hold over the premiership since Fouad Siniora became Prime 
Minister in the summer of 2005, Iran on the other hand gave full support to Hezbollah, seen as its 
main outpost in Lebanon. Stated otherwise, wider geo-political battles at the local and 
international levels caught the reconstruction drive in the crossfire. Tasks, which should have 
been performed by the state, were being undertaken primarily by local non-state players, 
especially Hezbollah, as well as regional and international players including the UNDP.  
 Even when it comes to providing security for its citizens, the Lebanese state is reliant on 
resolution 1701 which stabilizes the situation in the south
384
 and provides some protections from 
Israel, as well as on tacit understandings between the security forces and Hezbollah. 
Above all, there is no internal consensus in Lebanon about what constitutes an appropriate 
reconstruction and recovery process.  A case in point are the activities of the UNDP in Beirut 
Southern Suburbs which have not embraced Hezbollah (the dominant player in the area), and 
that have been viewed with skepticism by this group. 
Despite all the challenges, the UNDP was able to step in the area following the end of the war, 
for the first time in its presence in Lebanon, and initiated its emergency program immediately 
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after the war and later extended it to the recovery of lives and livelihoods program. 
Paradoxically, Hezbollah-run municipalities didn‘t refuse donations from Western countries and 
from the UNDP despite political fractions, and donors didn‘t hesitate to intervene or fund 
initiatives. As such, the post war reconstruction phase in the area witnessed for the first time the 
presence and intervention of major international actors that took on  a major role in this context, 
primarily  Western donors, the International organizations, International and local NGOs.  
In other words, and despite the troubled relationship between Hezbollah and many UN bodies, 
particularly the UNDP, elected officials who are known to be close to Hezbollah, didn‘t have 
qualms about  working with the UNDP. This made problematic (or be it in a positive way) the 
stereotypical image of the UNDP as a puppet of the west. For some elected officials in the area, 
who were known to have links to Hezbollah, the UNDP was seen as a positive influence on the 
community.  
The UNDP had signed agreements with elected municipal heads; and those agreements enabled 
the UNDP to implement projects with the support of local community and local authority. The 
UNDP couldn‘t have undertaken any imitative in Beirut Southern Suburbs, if Hezbollah hadn‘t 
accepted to operate. 
Those who worked with the UNDP didn‘t perceive it as a serious challenge to the political 
outlook of the program, as long as its activities were cleared by the elected municipal heads who 
presumably review those matters with the Party itself.  Implicitly Hezbollah gave the green light 
(or perhaps just the yellow light) because Hezbollah did not want to be seen as embracing the 
UNDP nor did the UNDP want to be seen as close to Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not completely 
closed to the idea of being linked to an International organization, as long as their work is 
perceived as non-political and non-threatening to the party‘s hold over the area. 
 
 
The paper‘s conclusion falls into two categories: evaluating the proclaimed objectives set 
by the UNDP while launching their first recovery intervention in the area after the July 2006 
war, and learning lessons for future interventions. 
Under the framework of recovering the affected area and providing support to the affected 
communities, the UNDP and western donors‘ statements fall under the headline of dealing with 
elected local authorities respecting as such the democratic rule in the country. 
While closely coordinating with the local communities at both grassroots and local authorities‘ 
level, the UNDP has built a strong and trusting relationship with all concerned entities, an 
important achievement for a better understanding of their social, economic, cultural and political 
aspects, and thus making for better planning and serving the community. The UNDP was also keen 
to maintain its ongoing constructive interventions in BSS particularly in order to be also perceived 
as a ―neutral arbiter‖ with the ability to positively affect livelihoods and opportunities of 
vulnerable groups, and to strengthen the inter-communal relationships between the local residents 
themselves, and with their local authorities.  
 The UNDP acted as first respondent making its presence felt shortly after hostilities ended, by 
providing food, temporally shelters and supplied needs for survival in collaboration with other 
UN agencies. Second it can be added that such interventions can be potentially influential to a 
large degree in local governance in the area, and more specifically the local community. On the 
other hand, reforms in the long term also has the potential to change population perceptions—a 
very important aspect in the complex political climate of Lebanon. However, one can argue that 
what subsequently happened in May 2008 (when Hezbollah took over most of Beirut in direct 
defiance to the government) suggest that the Lebanese political climate remained resistant to the 
 
 
impacts of governance interventions, and sectarianism again showed its powerful hold over the 
fragmented population.  
The UNDP‘s intervention in the area, aiming at providing recovery assistance as a primary 
objective, was very logical to a context of a damaged area where governance programming could 
be inappropriate when there was a need to meet other priorities such the reconstruction of 
damages and humanitarian needs. However, some viewed that this type of intervention as a 
calculated effort to use their post war reconstruction assistance to maximize political return, 
given the program‘s in depth understanding of Lebanon‘s politico-social intricacies. 
Reconstructing the area, repairing infrastructure and restoring lives and livelihoods could have 
an immediacy that governance programming can‘t achieve, especially given the dire financial 
situation of the Lebanese state; nevertheless this doesn‘t mean to halt the reform efforts exerted 
by the UNDP and western donors at the policy level.  
Because reconstruction assistance was often disbursed through municipalities and local 
community, and the organization‘s presence in the area allowed the UNDP to make connections 
to residents, political parties, and other local groups. On this level, the post-war reconstruction 
can be viewed as exceeding infrastructure rebuilding and building state capacity for the provision 
of social services. It goes further to affect the ambitions, and worldview of the key reconstruction 
actors: and in this case the UNDP‘s overall aims and objectives. The first conclusion can be 
drawn here that the UNDP‘s post war intervention in the area allowed many people to recover, 
and provided assistance to needs but was very limited in terms of policy change and furthermore 
in terms of political gain, if the intention ever existed. 
Although the organization was aware of the importance of the recovery phase, it was clear in its 
projects documents following the recovery phase, that: ―any reconstruction boom must be 
 
 
complemented with policy reforms and state intervention that would transform such a boom into 
more sustainable post-reconstruction economic growth.‖385 This was illustrated in the set of 
launched plans and strategy following the war by the UNDP in terms allocating pledges for the 
policy reforms and democratic governance, such as strengthening the electoral process in 
Lebanon, Capacity Development for Fiscal Reform and Management, and support to the Prime 
Minister Office in the launching of new initiatives to support the set of early recovery projects 
previously launched and to further replace them once those are resumed
386
. This was reflected in 
the launching of a set of poverty and social development initiatives on the ground, such as the 
ART GOLD program in the country including BSS, a project financed by the Government of 
Italy through the UNDP.
387
 ―The initiative was designed as a key [program] instrument in 
support of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) achievement, by focusing on building 
capacity for local governance and decentralized, participatory development management in 
[program] countries (the local dimension), and by facilitating and strengthening strategic 
partnerships and cooperative arrangements between different local development actors and 
between municipalities.‖388  
For a reconstruction to be successful, establishing a developmental state should be 
complementary to the reconstruction.  With this in mind, state intervention becomes needed in 
order to set national priorities and to have control over key sectors. In this respect, post war 
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reconstruction planning as viewed by the UNDP ―must be a part of a national development plan 
with clear macroeconomic and sectored objectives‖.389 
In reviewing the first interventions by the UNDP regarding the recovery of infrastructure and 
livelihoods, reviewers were relatively positive. The first reason was the existence of an urgent 
need for interventions in most areas, making any interventions successful.  
This paper has not elaborated on the strategies of the UNDP, ―in terms of the approach towards 
political transition or economic reform‖; it had rather identified and reviewed the initiatives 
implemented and their aims.
390
 It has focused on the planning process and implementation of 
initiatives to translate the UNDP ―inputs into outputs and outcomes on the ground.‖391 
There are important lessons to be drawn from BSS in many areas; like the success of recovering 
process from war, reintegration, restoration of lives and livelihoods. It seems clear that the first 
strategy in the area made a difference in a number of spheres, such as supporting communities, 
empowering affected women and youths, reducing unemployment, enhancing socio-economic 
conditions, etc…  
Beirut Southern Suburbs provides some valuable positive lessons. The UNDP‘s planning process 
did produce a set of plans and strategies that were of value to the UNDP‘s image in the area and 
in building trust with a new community in Lebanon.  
On the ground, the UNDP was relatively positively viewed by the community and the there was 
unanimous disapproval for the central government, that was seen as neglecting its role in helping 
its people.  Criticism was also aimed at some interventions that were seen as deficient and 
lacking in long term thinking and coordination or having a limited view of the situation and not 
completing the tasks needed, as well as being selective or biased in the distribution of aid. 
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The on-ground support helped to create a sense of cooperation with local authorities and citizens.  
This was accomplished by helping in the planning process and in strengthening the capabilities 
for implementation   attesting to the significance of the UNDP operations in BSS, local 
authorities reported that the UNDP was the first body to make its presence felt on the ground. 
Though modest in size, the quick delivered support package was viewed to have a high impact 
by the local authority representatives consulted by the mission. ―It has been particularly 
appreciated that - other than rubble clearance (which was a first priority anyway) - the 
prioritization of subsequent rehabilitation and recovery support by UNDP was left to the 
municipalities themselves‖.392 It was also highlighted that municipalities had gained precious 
time by being allowed to utilize the UNDP-standard contracting and procurement regulation. 
Moreover, as the UNDP project office was converted into becoming a UN Resident 
Coordinator‘s hub, it was seemingly successful in sharing information and coordinating support 
activities, while providing entry to UN agencies and NGOs that had not been active in this region 
previously.‖393 
The earlier and subsequent area-specific support following the war, had positive results and was 
a pioneer in having multiple objectives related to ameliorating the results of war, in addition to 
augmenting ―balanced regional development‖.394 After its completion, The Beirut suburbs 
projects had the following effects: ―improved livelihoods, increased confidence among 
communities and local leadership, and a foundation of support for development-management and 
good-governance practices.‖ 395 
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―UNDP (and its partners) proved to be guided by a strategy for transitioning from crisis-response 
and early-recovery to sustainable recovery (i.e. longer-term recovery, nationhood formation and 
development).‖396 This is reflected by the launching a new set of plans and programs in Lebanon 
and BSS as previously mentioned, including the ―ARTGOLD‖ initiative in the area, as well as 
the ―Peace building‖ project.397 Those initiatives comprised such components as ―the direct-
impact, local-level support interventions that builds onto the various recovery and socio-
economic development projects supported thus far, while capitalizing on the credibility earned 
due to the successful post-2006 early-recovery support‖, and above all peace building and crisis 
prevention.
398
 More importantly is that those projects would also engage with 
communities/municipalities that pertain to even pro Hezbollah run-municipalities – in order to 
cultivate trust and collaboration for the real needs of the population. 
In BSS, and before the recovery project was about to be wound-down, this project was launched 
through the UNDP- Social and Development Portfolio and settled in the area. Thus far the 
launching of ART GOLD seems to be efficient and necessary – ―as it could build onto the 
networking engineered by the completed UNDP sub-office recovery projects.‖399 In order to 
ensure success, the challenges in the area have to be scrutinized by the UNDP and its partners 
following the recovery period with the purpose of formulating a strategy that is able to maximize 
on previous successes in order to gain consensus just as it determinedly meets all challenges. 
The post-summer support consisted as an entry point for the lately launched ART GOLD project. 
The new project provided almost a similar intervention as the first stage and a more sustainable 
development strategy aiming at reducing crisis and maintaining peace building.  This project will 
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also be used to test and develop new methods for reconstruction and development.  It is 
successful outcomes to date in reaching out to most municipalities places it in an ideal place to 
generate broader strategies that will have long term impact. 
To conclude, enhancing the Lebanese government‘s capacity along with economic development 
plans and social reconciliation are key factors in creating a long-term solution and in ending the 
cycle of violence in Lebanon. Strengthening the government‘s legitimacy and role is akin to a 
safety net against insurgency, rather than the use of military action.   The UNDP presence in BSS 
could create a doorway through which the government can step in and assume its responsibilities 
and its proper role in the lives of its citizens. 
Following the summer war, the UNDP made some giant efforts in providing humanitarian relief, 
and at a later stage, in providing such services as food aid, and funding ―for water, sanitation, 
health projects, and de-mining efforts.‖400  However, the organization was not really active in 
solidifying the government‘s legitimacy or validity in the eyes of its citizens in BSS.  The UNDP 
should have a plan of promoting and strengthening the Lebanese government.  
Within this strategic context of governmental empowerment, future assistance should have a 
twofold aim:  Provide the needed services, and increase the role of the Lebanese government 
through delegating some aid responsibility to certain government agencies. Accelerating the 
distribution of additional funding and assistance is another very important measure that the 
UNDP can take to empower the Lebanese government. Additionally, the presence of 
―ARTGOLD‖ in the area raises hope for implementing more developed initiatives aiming at 
further sustaining peace building and social development.  
In conclusion, the weakness of the state, the role of non-state actors, including International 
organizations such as UNDP, proved again that the role of non-state actors in the development  
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process in third world countries especially those like Lebanon that have undertaken violent and 
destructive conflicts, deficit and financial problems, as well as internal political and sectarian 
fractions, is growing. 
Once more, the summer 2006 war had revealed the weakness of the Lebanese state in planning 
and undertaking an emergency plan capable of sustaining development and recovery. The 
various emerging funding towards the post-war reconstruction period in Lebanon could have 
brought some satisfactory financial compensation but no long term solutions. As such, now it is 
more than due time for the Lebanese state to re-consider the establishment of a strategic 
emergency plan.  
On the other hand, the new positive image of UNDP in the BSS area, the positive socio-
economic impacts of the implemented initiatives, the capacity building of local authority and 
civil society, all of the above shows the positive role an Intentional organization such UNDP can 
play in the reconstruction process. But once more without ignoring the leading role the state must 
play in setting in order to set national priorities and have control over key actors, and which is 
not playing in many spheres, again leaving the ground for a growing role to non-state actors.  
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